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This academic research is aimed at cleanly trace the effect of an 
unanticipated exogenous shock to different economic components. I 
use the same methodology, namely a difference-in-differences 
estimation, in order to identify the incentive effects of an exogenous 
shock. The research proceeds as follows. The first article analyses the 
impact of the Banking Union on European bank credit risk. I find that, 
after a supervision reform, European banks directly supervised by the 
ECB reduced their riskiness. The second article analyses the impact of 
temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements (swap lines) on 
international reserves. I find empirical evidences that those countries - 
involved in swap lines by the FED, when these temporary global 
financial crisis arrangements expired - started to accumulate reserves to 
a greater extent to the other considered EME. Finally, I study the effects 
of the negative interest rate policies on European competition. I find 
that, when entering into a negative interest rate territory, European 
banks increase their market power. 
All empirical evidences passed a battery of robustness tests that support 
the reliability of my analysis. These studies are intended to contribute 
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Centralised or Decentralised Banking Supervision? Evidence 




This paper analyses the impact of the Banking Union on European bank credit risk. 
Specifically, we investigate the effect that the establishment of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism has had on the credit risk of the banks it supervises in comparison to financial 
institutions that are still supervised by National Supervisory Authorities. We analyse a sample 
of 746 European banks over the period 2011-2018, by means of a difference-in-differences 
methodology. We provide empirical evidence that Single Supervisory Mechanism supervised 
banks reduced credit risk exposure compared to banks supervised by National Supervisory 
Authorities, suggesting that the Banking Union has successfully reduced the riskiness of the 
European banking sector. Our results passed a battery of robustness tests that support the 
reliability of our analysis. Our contribution sheds light on the benefits of centralised versus 
decentralised supervision, on the effectiveness of the current supervisory system in Europe, 
and on its impact on European bank risk. 
 
 
Keywords: Banking Union; Bank Credit Risk; Banking Supervision; Regulation; Difference-
in-Differences  
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1. Introduction  
The role of supervisory authorities is crucial for the stability of the banking sector (Barth et al., 
2004; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006). Weaknesses in regulation and 
supervision are widely considered amongst the main determinants of the global financial crisis 
(GFC) (Chan-Lau, 2010; Levine, 2010; Merrouche and Neir, 2010; and Barth et al., 2012). 
Consequently, banking regulation and supervision have been frequently revised over the last 
years and the Banking Union has been one of the most important institutional response to the 
crisis in Europe (Carboni et al., 2017). 
 
The Banking Union was officially established in November 2014 and it is organized in two 
pillars: (i) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and (ii) the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM). The main objective of the SRM is to guarantee the efficient resolution of failing 
financial institutions with low costs for taxpayers and for the economy as a whole. The other 
pillar of the Banking Union consists in the establishment of a new supervisory authority, the 
SSM directly led by the European Central Bank (ECB), whose main responsibility is banking 
supervision.1 However, the SSM is not in charge of supervising all European banks. The 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN, 2012) has set the framework and the 
criteria that the ECB should use to identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
to be supervised by the SSM. The SSM framework regulation identifies four “significance 
criteria”: size, economic importance, cross-border activities, and public financial assistance. 
To qualify as significant, banks must fulfil at least one of the four criteria, and therefore falling 
under the direct supervision of the ECB, through the SSM. There are currently 117 banks in 19 
countries supervised by the SSM representing 85 percent of total assets of the whole European 
banking sector (Nouy, 2015).2 The SSM directly supervises these banks, whereas national 
supervisory authorities (NSAs) continue to supervise the remaining part of their national 
banking system.3 
There are several reasons why the ECB decided to take charge of the supervision of SIFIs. 
First, a centralised supervision has been considered an effective way to reduce the excessive 
credit risk exposure and to tackle the related issue of the outstanding amount of non-performing 
loans (NPLs) in banks’ balance sheet (Enria, 2019). Second, the Banking Union has been a 
 
1 For more information see the Regulation (EU) No 806/2014, available from:  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=EN 
2 For the full list of SSM supervised financial institutions see: 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.listofsupervisedentities201912.en.pdf 
3 A more detailed timetable of the key steps of European Banking Union is provided in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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way to deal with the problems related to the link between sovereign debt and banking risk 
(Gerlach et al., 2010; Dermine, 2020). Third, a decentralised supervision may lead to 
regulatory and supervision arbitrage between credit institutions located in different European 
member states (so-called regulatory and supervision arbitrage4) that tend to prefer member 
states with lax supervision; while a centralised supervision could overcome these issues. 
Fourth, elevate standards are required not only in financial regulation, but also in banking 
supervision in order to ensure financial stability. Supervision and regulation complement each 
other, as without a reliable supervisory framework, financial regulation would be ineffective 
(De Larosière, 2009).  
 
The literature has proposed two theoretical frameworks to analyse the effectiveness of 
centralised banking supervision compared to the decentralised model. First, Agarwal et al. 
(2014) remark the superior effectiveness of a central supervisor model. The authors show that 
local and supranational supervisors could have different aims, and the former are likely to use 
their supervisory power in order to protect national banks and to pursue national objectives that 
might have detrimental effects at systemic wide level. Hence, a supranational supervisor should 
be better suited to supervise large and systemically important financial institutions, as it is not 
subjected to this kind of conflict of interest. Second, by analysing the behaviour of a 
supervisory authorities in the “hub-and-spokes” regime, Carletti et al. (2020) provides another 
interesting viewpoint. The “hub-and-spokes” regime is a model where a central supervisory 
authority has juridical power over the decisions concerning banks, and it relies on local 
supervisors to collect the information necessary to perform its monitoring function. Carletti et 
al.’s (2020) theoretical model posits that the “hub-and-spokes” regime can succeed in reducing 
bank risk taking, if local supervisors act according to a centralised mandate.   
 
This paper investigates whether the centralised supervisory framework introduced by the 
Banking Union via the implementation of the SSM has been effective in reducing credit risk 
of SSM supervised banks in comparison to those monitored by NSAs. To this aim, we employ 
a sample of 746 European banks over the period 2011-2018 and a difference-in-differences 
(DiD) methodology. We focus on credit risk as non-performing loans grew extraordinary 
following the European sovereign debt crisis5. This has pushed policy-makers to prioritise 
 
4 For more information on the concept of regulatory arbitrage, see Karolyi et al. (2015). 
5 The academic literature has analyzed the influence of banking supervision on credit provisioning. See for 
instance Fratzscher et al. (2016). 
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actions to tackle this problem (Enria, 2019) and the new supervisory framework introduced by 
the Banking Union has specifically targeted banks’ credit risk exposure (ECB, 2016). To 
preview our main findings, we provide empirical evidence that the establishment of the SSM 
has contributed to reduce the credit risk exposure of those financial institutions directly 
supervised by the SSM. This result supports the idea that the central supervision model is more 
effective than the decentralised one. Our results stand up well to a battery of robustness checks 
such as different measures of credit risk and overall risk as well as placebo and sample selection 
bias tests. These findings suggest that the Banking Union has successfully reduced the riskiness 
of the European banking sector, and shed light on the effectiveness of the supervisory 
arrangement in Europe. 
 
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. We contribute to the empirical 
literature that studies the effectiveness of centralised and decentralised supervisory settings, 
and to the literature on bank risk, by focusing on the effects of different banking supervision 
regimes on credit risk. Although other papers have studied different banking supervision 
settings, the literature that analyses the effects of radical changes in banking supervision by 
focusing on bank risk is scarce. We also analyse the effects that an under-researched regulatory 
change (i.e. the Banking Union) has had on bank credit risk.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature related to these topics 
and develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the methodology, variables, and 




2. Literature Review and Hypothesis tests 
2.1 Literature Review 
The academic debate on the benefits and drawbacks of centralised banking supervision has 
started well before the GFC and the problems that have induced the European System of 
Central Banks to establish the SSM. Peek et al. (1999) shed light on an important advantage of 
the centralised framework, suggesting that it is important to centralise supervisory 
responsibilities and monetary policy under a single authority, as confidential information on 
banks help policy makers to predict macroeconomic factors. The debate has focused in 
particular on whether centralised regulation and supervision lead to higher levels financial 
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stability than a decentralized framework (Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Martimort, 1999; 
Laffont and Pouyet, 2004; among others). Laffont and Pouyet (2004) propose a theoretical 
analysis to describe the drawbacks of decentralisation in comparison to centralisation. In a 
decentralised framework, each bank is supervised by a different authority in different countries. 
This factor generates competition between different cross-border authorities, which leads to an 
increase in the contractual power of banks, jeopardizing the effectiveness of banking 
supervision. In this regard, it is worth to mention that a centralized supervision is not optimal 
for any context. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006a) provide a model that postulates that a 
centralised supervisory framework is more likely to emerge in countries characterised by a 
certain degree of homogeneity. Also Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2008, 2012) cast doubts on the 
effectiveness of centralised supervision. Through the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Surveys (BRSSs), these authors study the relationship between specific regulatory 
and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efficiency, and fragility. They 
conclude that, while many countries strengthened capital regulations and official supervisory 
agencies over time, these reforms are not likely to improve neither bank stability nor efficiency. 
Hence, there is no significant relation between official supervisory power and bank efficiency. 
In summary, these economic surveys provide conflicting predictions about the impact of 
regulatory and supervisory policies on bank performance.  
 
The literature on these topics has gained momentum after the financial crisis. An extensive 
strand of literature argues that inadequate regulation and poor supervision were amongst the 
main causes of the GFC (Levine, 2010; Merrouche and Neir, 2010; Barth et al., 2012). This 
has raised important questions on the effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework. De Larosière (2009) has been among the first to advocate a European centralised 
system of regulation and supervision. According to his report, weak banking supervision was 
amongst the main determinants of the GFC. De Larosière (2009) stresses that supervision and 
regulation are interdependent, because without an adequate supervisory framework the 
renewed financial regulation would be ineffective. Thus, elevate standards are required in both 
regulation and supervision in order to ensure financial stability. 
 
Schoenmaker (2011) and Obstfeld (2014) use the financial trilemma to highlight the benefits 
of a centralized supervision.6 The financial trilemma assumes that (1) financial integration, (2) 
 
6 For more information on the financial trilemma see Rodrik (2000). 
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financial stability and (3) national financial policies are incompatible. Only two of the three 
objectives can be achieved. The financial trilemma suggests that the delicate role of regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions should be shifted at the European level (Schoenmaker, 
2011). Obstfeld (2014), referring to the euro area, suggests that macro-prudential supervision 
and Banking Union are the solution to ensure financial stability. It is clear that a supranational 
central supervisory authority would have been a step ahead towards the solution of the financial 
trilemma. Aside from the literature that analyses the financial trilemma, other studies have 
supported the idea of a centralised supervision in Europe. Poghosyan and Cihak (2011) state 
that an important argument in favour of a more centralised banking regulation and supervision 
in the EU is related to the fact that European bank risks have become increasingly homogenous. 
In this context, a supranational supervisor would be in the position to fulfil its role more 
effectively. 
 
Beck et al. (2013) argue that centralisation is able to offset a wide range of national effects for 
the sake of systemic wide financial stability. However, they also identify some weaknesses of 
centralised supervision. The first is related to information asymmetry. National supervisors 
might have a deeper knowledge of their supervised entities, in comparison to a supranational 
supervisor. Secondly, in case of intervention in support of troubled banks, a different legal 
framework can lead the supranational supervisor to a longer and more expensive resolution, in 
comparison to a national supervisor that may be more supportive with its supervised entities. 
Hence, a sufficient degree of homogeneity in banking regulation is necessary for a central 
supervisory arrangement to be fully effective. 
 
The current supervisory architecture in Europe is not the only banking supervision framework 
that is based on both centralised and decentralised supervision. The peculiarities of the U.S. 
framework provide useful insights to study the effects of different supervisory settings. These 
aspects have been analysed by Agarwal et al. (2014), who exploit the exogenously 
predetermined alternation of state (decentralised) and federal (centralised) supervision in the 
U.S. to analyse the effects of a dual supervisory mechanism. Their study provides empirical 
evidence that local banking supervisors are more lenient than federal ones. More specifically, 
local supervisors may have different objectives than those of the central agency and are in 
general less inclined to intervene. U.S. banks anticipate the different attitude of federal and 
national supervisors by modifying their loan quality and leverage ratio figures. Under federal 
regulators, banks report higher NPLs, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower ROA. 
17 
 
Furthermore, there is a greater frequency of bank failures and bank-related issues in states with 
more lenient supervision relative to the federal benchmark. Hence, the accommodating 
supervision of decentralised supervisors may have detrimental effects for the whole banking 
system. Overall, centralisation is likely to raise supervisory standards and deal with the 
perceived laxness and unwillingness to intervene that led to the recent crisis. In contrast, 
decentralised supervision and different national jurisdictions may create relative advantages 
amongst the supervisory and regulatory systems, jeopardizing the systemic-wide financial 
stability (Scott, 1977).  
 
After the establishment of the banking union, some studies have focused on the analysis of its 
effects. However, notwithstanding the importance of the topic in question, this strand of 
literature is not yet well developed. Carboni et al. (2017), analysing daily log-returns over a 
252 trading-day of 158 listed European banks, assess the impact that the announcement of the 
names of the banks that were going to be supervised by the SSM has had on their stock prices. 
Their contribution provides evidence that investors penalized the banks supervised by the SSM, 
because of the fear of regulatory inconsistencies. In contrast, Sahin and De Haan (2016) find 
that European bank stock market prices and credit default swap showed no reaction to the 
Banking Union. A recent paper written by Sáiz et al. (2019) addresses the question as to 
whether the Banking Union has influenced the contagion mechanism amongst financial 
institutions and sovereign risk, which was amongst the main goals of the ECB. These authors 
do not find robust evidence that the Banking Union decreased the contagion between bank 
stock returns and sovereign risk. Colliard (2020) focuses on bank regulation within the Banking 
Union, stating that the supervisory architecture may be an important determinant of the 
regulatory effectiveness. By analysing the short-term effect of the comprehensive assessment 
before the SSM launch, Fiordelisi et al. (2017) find that banks reduced their lending activities 
in order to increase their level of capitalisation. Even though there are other studies that 
investigate various issues related to the Banking Union (Kudrna, 2016; Hüser et al., 2018), the 
academic literature on this topic is scant. Thus, this topic requires further investigations, as it 
is important to understand the various effects that the launch of the SSM and the Banking Union 
has had on the banking system (Colliard, 2020). Lastly, our study is also motivated by the fact 
that although, an ample literature analyses the impact of regulation on bank behaviour by 
focusing on bank risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Harris and Raviv, 2014; among others), only a 




2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The current European supervisory system entails a close cooperation between national 
supervisors and the SSM. Consequently, the theories that study the effectiveness of the 
monitoring function in a multi-supervisor setting (Agarwal et al., 2014; Carletti et al., 2020), 
and more generally the studies that analyze the benefits of a more integrated supervisory regime 
(De Larosière et al., 2009; Schoenmaker, 2011) represent fundamental points of reference for 
our analysis. 
 
Carletti et al. (2020) propose a theoretical framework that is particularly useful for our research 
setting. They analyse the behaviour of the supervisory authorities in the “hub-and-spokes” 
regime. It consists in a model where a central supervisory authority has juridical power over 
the decisions concerning banks, even though it relies on local supervisors to collect the 
information necessary to perform its monitoring function. The authors themselves admit that 
their theoretical analysis is inspired by the European banking supervision structure. This model 
suggests that if the NSAs (spokes) and the SSM (hub) act jointly with the same goals, the 
effectiveness of the entire supervisory system would be guaranteed. Carletti et al. (2020, pp. 
2) also argue that “internal mechanisms need to be devised to guarantee that the “spokes” act 
according to the centralized mandate. Various elements of the institutional design in the 
banking union in Europe […] go in this direction. For example, in Europe, onsite inspections 
at the largest banks are conducted by multicountry teams headed by European Central Bank 
officials in order to facilitate the exchange of information.”  Hence, according to this theoretical 
analysis, the SSM central supervision may be more effective than that of NSAs, resulting in 
lower levels of risk for SSM supervised banks. 
 
Agarwal et al. (2014) study bank supervisors’ decisions in the U.S. framework, by exploiting 
a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal or state supervisors to the same bank 
at predetermined time intervals. Their research question is the following: “Does regulatory 
effectiveness depend only on written rules, or do the institutions that are entrusted with 
implementing those rules also matter for regulatory outcomes?”. Agarwal et. al. (2014) show 
that different supervisory authorities implement the same rules inconsistently, as they have 
different objective functions. More specifically, local supervisory authorities tend to carry out 
a softer monitoring activity during stressed economic periods, because a tough supervision 
could increase the probability of bank failure. This circumstance could in turn lead to a 
reduction of the local lending activity and of national banking jobs (local interest hypothesis). 
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In contrast, central supervisors are more concerned about the overall systemic stability, rather 
than about the geographical distribution of bank jobs and lending supply. According to this 
reasoning, a central supervisor may perform better than local supervisory authorities, as the 
former does not have any specific interests in favouring the national banking sector. The central 
supervisor is focused on the stability at systemic wide level, whilst local supervisory authorities 
have specific interests on their respective geographic areas. Specifically, local supervisors may 
compete with each other, as they may want to attract financial institutions from close areas. In 
order to achieve this goal, they perform a softer monitoring function, giving banks the chance 
to exploit a regulatory arbitrage and undermining the stability of the whole banking system. 
 
The findings of Agarwal et al. (2014) are fundamental to understand the trade-offs of the 
distribution of supervisory functions and responsibilities across different authorities. Although 
European local supervisors might have an advantage in terms of information, as they have been 
the sole supervisors for a long time, their objective functions are important in determining the 
outcomes of their supervisory function. For example, NSAs may be softer with distressed 
banks, if they are too big to fail at national level. Furthermore, NSAs may have a close 
relationship with their national governments. Thus, according to the local interest theory, a 
central supervisor should perform a more effective monitoring activity than several local 
supervisors, as they are focused on specific local issues and not interested in the stability of the 
financial sector at systemic wide level. Specifically, in our research setting, the ECB should be 
a better supervisor than NSAs, resulting in a more effective monitoring for SSM supervised 
banks in comparison to nationally supervised financial institutions. This enhanced supervisory 
framework should significantly impact the risk exposure level of the financial institutions 
directly supervised by the SSM. We support this argument in light of the vast literature which 
remarks that the quality of the supervisory function is an important determinant of bank risk 
(Barth. et al., 2004; Buch and DeLong, 2008; Maddaloni and Peydró 2011; Lee & Hsieh, 2014; 
Shehzad and De Haan, 2015, amongst others) and based on the idea that “a supervisor’s job is 
to collect information about banks’ portfolios and, upon obtaining it, to intervene if a bank is 
deemed to be too risky.” (Carletti et al., 2020, pp.1). In particular, since credit risk has been 
considered an ECB supervisory priority since shortly after the establishment of the Banking 
Union7 (ECB, 2016; Enria, 2019), we contend that the SSM has significantly contributed to 
 




lessen credit risk for SSM supervised banks. For these reasons, we develop our research 
hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: The establishment of the SSM has led to a significant reduction of the credit risk exposure 
level of SSM supervised financial institutions compared to nationally supervised banks. 
 
3. Methodology & Data 
3.1 Methodology  
We employ a DiD approach to study the effect of the Banking Union on bank credit risk. 
Various banking studies employ this methodology (Morkoetter et al., 2014; Becchetti et al., 
2016; Walker & Wu, 2019), especially when it comes to evaluate the impact of policy changes 
(Giannetti & Jentzsch, 2013; Argimón et al. 2017; Fiordelisi et al. 2017).  This methodology 
has the advantage to use a panel data set up to compare a treated group of banks (those affected 
by the policy change) with a control group (those unaffected by the policy change). 
Specifically, we compare the effect of the Banking Union on credit risk for our treatment group, 
with a control group of European banks that are under the supervision of the SSM. The 
regression model takes the following form 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽′𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + γj  + φ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  [1] 
 
Where Yijt  represents our measures of credit risk for bank i in country j at time t. Specifically, 
we use loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLR_GL) and loan loss provisions to gross loan 
(LLP_GL). Treated is a binary variable equal to unity if bank i in country j is under the 
supervision of the SSM, 0 if it falls under the NSAs supervision. Post is a binary variable equal 
to unity in the years following the establishment of the SSM, 0 otherwise. β1 represents the 
average difference in LLR_GL and LLP_GL between banks that switched to the SSM 
supervision and banks that did not. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 denotes our vector of control variables. Specifically, 
we include the logarithm of the bank total asset (Size), total customer deposits-to-total assets 
(Funding Structure), gross loans-to-total assets (Asset Structure), return on assets 
(Profitability), and equity-to-total assets (Capitalisation). As for the macroeconomic control 
variables, we include the economic growth (GDP), inflation and gross domestic saving-to-GDP 
(Saving Propensity). We include country fixed effects (γ) to control for unobservable country-
specific characteristics that can affect LLR_GL and LLP_GL. We also control for time-variant 
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shocks over the sample period on bank credit risk with year effects (φ). All regressions are 
estimated with bank-level clustering, thus allowing for correlation in the error terms. We use 
robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and dependence (Bertrand et al., 2004; 
Donald and Lang, 2007; Petersen, 2009). 
 
The DiD model must satisfy the parallel trend assumption to ensure suitability to analyse the 
effect of the SSM on bank credit risk (Bertrand et al., 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
According to the parallel trend assumption, changes in the dependent variables over time 
should be exactly the same in both treatment (banks supervised by SSM) and control groups 
(banks supervised by NSAs) in the absence of the intervention (the introduction of the Banking 
Union). Figure 1 shows that the main dependent variables in both treated and control groups, 
have a similar trend from 2011 to 2014 (pre-treatment period).  The assumption holds since the 
trend lines move together before implementation of the Banking Union in 2014. Fig. 1 shows 
the level of LLR_GL and LLP_GL, from 2011 to 2014 for both Banking Union affected and 
non-affected banks. As displayed, LLR_GL and LLP_GL move in the same direction in the 
pre-treatment period (correlation among the treatment and control is 0.86 for LLR_GL and 
0.90 for LLP_GL). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
3.2 Data 
We construct a dataset from several sources. Bank balance sheet information are collected from 
Moody’s BankFocus (Bureau Van Dijk), whilst macroeconomic variables are retrieved from 
World Development Indicators (World Bank). The dataset consists of 19 European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). 
Similarly to Fiordelisi et al. (2017), we focus only on credit institutions and financial holding 
companies (FHCs)8 following the classification provided by BankFocus. Table 1 (Panel A) 
shows the sample divided by bank specialisation and country. Given that BankFocus comprises 
financial statement data that can either be consolidated or unconsolidated, we include in our 
dataset the data that are either unconsolidated or consolidated but without an unconsolidated 
 
8 Similarly to Fiordelisi et al. (2017), we do not consider cooperative banks, investment banks, private banking, 
mortgage banks and savings banks because they have different business models. 
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subsidiary, in order to avoid the inclusion of duplicate observations. The final sample consists 
of 746 banks in the Euro area; 95 are supervised by the SSM (treatment group) and 651 
supervised by NSAs (control group), over the 2011 – 2018 period. Table 1 (Panel B) provides 
a snapshot of the number of banks divided by supervisor and country. Bank balance sheets are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
 
[ Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and other balance sheet and macroeconomic 
variables in the treatment and control groups prior and after the establishment of the SSM are 
shown in Table 2. We use the ratios of loan loss reserves-to-gross loans (LLR_GL) as a first 
measure of bank credit risk (Barry et al., 2011). Altunbas et al. (2007) suggest that higher levels 
of loan loss reserves can be interpreted as greater bank risk. Therefore, we expect – after the 
introduction of the new supervisory mechanism – to observe a contraction of the reserve for 
loan losses among SSM supervised banks in comparison to those banks supervised by NSAs. 
As a second measure of credit risk, we employ the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross loans 
(LLP_GL), which is considered an indicator of asset quality (e.g., Williams, 2004). Previous 
studies have found that banks increase provisions when they expect credit risk to deteriorate 
(Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Since our expectation is to observe a significant reduction of 
bank credit risk, we expect to observe a reduction of loan loss provisions for those banks 
supervised by the SSM after its establishment. 
 
As reported in Table 2, the average value of LLR_GL and the LLP_GL before the introduction 
of the European Banking Union for treatment and control groups is statistically different. 
Contrarily, after the introduction of the Banking Union the average value of LLR_GL and 
LLP_GL between the treatment and control group loses its statistical significance. This primary 
result indicates that the SSM appears to have reduced the difference in credit risk between SSM 
and NSA banks. Indeed, after the introduction of the centralised supervisory system, the treated 
banks have experienced a contraction of LLR_GL and LLP_GL from 5% to 4.6% and from 
1.2% and 0.6%, respectively. On the contrary, the control group shows that, after 2014, a slight 
decrease of LLP_GL (from 1% to 0.7%) and an increase in LLR_GL (from 4.4% to 4.7%). 
  
Balance sheet variables. Panels B and E of Table 2 display summary descriptive statistics for 
bank balance sheet data divided by the treatment and control group. We include total customer 
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deposits-to-total assets (Funding Structure) as a measure of bank funding structure. The 
relationship between bank funding structure and credit risk is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
retail deposits are considered a more stable source of funds than wholesale funding (Gatev and 
Strahan, 2006). Laeven et al. (2014) suggest that customer deposits improve bank performance, 
while wholesale funding is considered to be a major source of vulnerability. Similarly, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) argue that an extensive use of non-deposit funding is 
more profitable but, at the same time, riskier. On the other hand, Bologna (2011) indicates that 
market funding may be relatively cheaper and it allows more flexibility for banks in financing 
projects.  
 
We employ the ratio of gross loan-to-total assets (Asset Structure) to control for bank asset 
structure. This variable indicates whether bank business model is based on traditional lending 
activities. We expect a positive relationship as banks that engage more in lending activity to be 
more exposed to credit risk (Altunbas et al., 2007). We also control for bank size (Size), 
computed as the logarithm of bank total assets. The too-big-too-fail hypothesis suggests a 
positive relationship between bank size and risk (Stern and Feldman, 2004). However, portfolio 
diversifications, lower funding costs and better managerial skills may lead to an inverse 
relationship (Bertay et al., 2013).  
 
The regressions also include a measure of profitability (Profitability). On the one hand, less 
profitable banks face incentives to take risks in an attempt to boost profitability (Mare, 2015; 
Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011). On the other hand, profitable banks could use their resources to 
increase risky lending. Hence, the sign of the expected relationship is unknown. Following 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), we employ the ratio of equity-to-total assets (Capitalisation) 
as a measure of bank capitalisation. While highly capitalised banks can increase their risk 
exposure, binding capital constraints mitigate banking risk for undercapitalised banks 
(Gambacorta and Shin, 2018; De Nicolò et al., 2010). Hence, we may expect a positive 
relationship. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that banks might gamble for 
resurrection, or that weakly capitalised banks assume greater risks to increase earnings, which, 
if retained, could strengthen bank equity; thereby improving their soundness (Calem and Rob, 
1999). If this is the case, a negative relationship is plausible.  
 
Macroeconomic variables. Panels C and F of Table 2 show summary descriptive statistics for 
the macroeconomic variables. Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) argue that a deterioration in the 
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macroeconomic environment is transmitted to banks credit quality, which in turn, can affect 
loan loss reserves and provisioning (Schinasi, 2005). Hence, it is of great importance to control 
for the macroeconomic environment when investigating changes in bank credit risk. We 
include GDP growth (GDP), as it is one of the main macroeconomic factors that affects credit 
risk (Blaschke and Jones, 2001). However, GDP growth may have opposite effects on credit 
risk. On the one hand, GDP growth indicates a stable macroeconomic environment, which is 
related to a lower probability of bank distress, therefore banks may exploit this situation by 
increasing risk (Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2008; Poghosyan and Cihak, 2011). On the other 
hand, several studies find that banks behave procyclically, therefore they increase their risk 
provisions when the economic environment weakens (Arpa et al., 2001; Guidara et al., 2013).  
 
We also include the ratio of domestic savings to GDP (Saving Propensity). Festic et al. (2011) 
provide evidence of the relationship between savings and bank credit quality. Greater domestic 
savings increase bank deposits and liquidity. This, in turn, may boost bank lending and 
consequently loan loss provisions and reserves. Finally, we control for inflation (Inflation). 
Gerlach et al. (2005) provide evidence of an inverse relationship between credit risk and 
inflation. Borrowers’ ability to fulfil original obligations improves as inflation erodes the real 
value of debt. Hence, we expect to observe a negative relationship between credit risk and 
inflation.9 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Table 3 shows the results of our empirical analysis from estimating equation [1] and it is 
organized in 8 columns. Column 1 and 2 include the coefficient of the interaction between the 
dummy Treated and the dummy Post together with country- and time-fixed effects. In columns 
3 and 4, we add the bank-specific variables and keep both country- and time-fixed effects, 
whilst in columns 5 and 6, we substitute country- and time-fixed effects with country*time 
fixed effects. In columns 7 and 8, we present results with banks specific variables, 
macroeconomic variables and country- and time-fixed effects. Our main interest is the 
 
9 A more detailed explanation of the variables and expected signs are provided in Table A2 in the appendix.  
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magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the coefficient of β1 that represents the average 
difference in LLR_GL and LLP_GL between banks that switched to the SSM supervision and 
those that remained under the supervision of NSAs; denoted in the table as Centralised 
Supervision dummy. 
 
Our results show that the coefficient of Centralised Supervision dummy is negative and 
statistically significant in each specification, suggesting that SSM supervised banks (SIFIs) 
reduced their credit risk after the implementation of the Banking Union in comparison to banks 
supervised by NSAs. Specifically, SSM banks reduced LLR_GL and LLP_GL by 0.94 and 
0.51 percentage points, respectively (columns 1 and 2). This result is consistent with our 
research hypothesis that a centralised supervisory mechanism is more effective than a 
decentralised one, as it is neutral from national interests aimed at protecting national banking 
sectors. Furthermore, these results support the idea that the centralised mandate under which 
the NSAs operate guarantees the effectiveness of SSM supervision and allows the ECB to 
achieve its policy objectives in terms of reduction in credit risk (ECB, 2016; Enria, 2019).  
 
Our results are robust to different econometric specifications. In columns 3 and 4, we report 
the results from regressions augmented with bank control variables where we continue to 
observe a statistically significant effect of the Centralised Supervision dummy. Only few bank-
specific variables are statistically significant. Specifically, we find an inverse relationship 
between size (Size) and bank risk (LLP_GL). This indicates that portfolio diversification and 
management quality permit larger banks to limit their exposure to credit risks. We also observe 
a negative relationship between profitability (Profitability) and both measures of bank risk. 
This result is in line with the idea that less profitable banks invest in risker assets to boost 
profits. In columns 5 and 6, we tighten our econometric specification replacing year and 
country fixed effects by including country*time fixed effects to account for time varying 
country-level unobservable heterogeneity. As displayed, the coefficient Centralised 
Supervision, although slightly smaller in magnitude, keeps the significance level providing 
further validity of our estimation. Finally, columns 7 and 8 report the results by including 
additional country-specific controls. While the coefficient of the interaction dummy maintains 
the statistical significance level, the coefficient of inflation (Inflation) displays a negative 
relationship with banking risk. This suggests that very low inflation levels are usually 
associated to deteriorated macroeconomic condition and/or slow economies and, consequently, 
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to higher credit risk. Finally, we find that GDP growth (GDP) is positively related to LLR_GL 
but negatively to LLP_GL.   
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
 
4.3 Robustness checks 
4.3.1 Non-Performing Loans and Z-Score 
We test the robustness of our results to a different definition of the dependent variable, by using 
Non-Performing Loans (NPL Ratio) ratio as an alternative credit risk measure. Several studies 
have used NPL ratio as proxy for bank credit risk (Berger and De Young, 1997; Williams, 
2004, among others). In addition, in order to understand whether the results of our analysis are 
driven solely by credit risk, we use Z-score as an alternative dependent variable10, which 
represents an overall measure of banking risk (Agoraki et al., 2011; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Beck et al. 2013; Mohsni and Otchere, 2014). The Z-score indicates the number of standard 
deviations that return on assets have to fall below the average for the bank to become insolvent. 
A high Z-score suggests a sound bank, which is unlikely to fail (Delis and Staikouras, 2011). 
Most credit risk proxies are affected by the problem that they assume a backward-looking 
approach and are procyclical (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). In 
contrast, the Z-score can be interpreted as a forward-looking measure of risk, as the variance 
at the denominator captures potential changes in bank risk level (Delis and Staikouras, 2011). 
 
We use the logarithmic version of both NPL ratio and Z-Score, to avoid problems owing to the 
skewness in the distribution (Baselga-Pascual, 2015). The two new regressions (Table 4, panel 
A) show that the Centralised Supervision dummy is negative and statistically significant, which 
indicates that the banks supervised by SSM have reduced both credit and overall risk since the 
introduction of the new supervisory system (columns 1, and 2). The results of this robustness 
check are consistent with those of our previous specification, confirming the validity of the 




10 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝜎(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡
; where ROA is return on assets for bank i at time t, EA is the ratio of equity-to-total assets, 
and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA in country j at time t. 
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4.3.2 Placebo test 
The results of our DiD estimation might be driven by other events occurred before the sample 
period we are analyzing. Hence, we investigate whether there have been other factors that have 
influenced bank credit risk before the establishment of the SSM. To rule out this possibility we 
create a fictitious post dummy starting in 2012 and study its effect over the 2009-2018 time 
horizon, extending our sample period of two years. The results reported in Panel B of Table 4 
show that the coefficient of the dummy variable is not statistically significant for any of the 
dependent variables (columns 3 and 4). This finding supports our original hypothesis that the 
reduction of the risk exposure level of SSM supervised financial institutions is associated to 
the Banking Union, rather than to other past events. Moreover, since the Banking Union has 
been announced in 2012, we also exclude the possibility that the results were associated to the 
announcement of the Banking Union, rather than its actual implementation. 
 
4.3.3 Removing Germany and France 
We also test whether our results are driven by a sample selection bias. We remove Germany 
and France from our sample, as they have the largest number of banks in the sample (110 and 
115 banks, respectively). Firstly, we remove all German banks from our original sample. 
Secondly, we proceed removing all banks located in France. Panels C and D of Table 4 show 
that the results are qualitatively unchanged from our baseline model, confirming that our results 
are not affected by a sample selection bias. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
 
4.3.4 SSM supervision in non-GIIPS countries 
The results of our analysis might be driven by the sovereign debt crisis shock that hit some 
European countries during the 2010-2012 period. During the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, 
the link between sovereign and banking risk increased considerably, and it was marked in 
weaker countries (De Bruyckere et al., 2013). Shambaugh (2012) uses the acronym GIIPS to 
represent the five most troubled economies of the Eurozone11. Their weakness is due to the fact 
that access to government bond markets became difficult during the crisis (Popov and Van 
Horen, 2013). Several banks had an excessively large exposure in domestic bonds, and 
 
11 They are the following: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. 
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therefore the sovereign weaknesses were transmitted to the banking system (Neri, 2013; 
Acharya et al., 2015; De Marco, 2019). By analysing Italian banking industry, Bofondi et al. 
(2018) identify a causual link between the sovereign debt crisis and bank credit supply. 
Specifically, this crisis resulted in a significant reduction in lending, which is in turn associated 
to lower levels of bank credit risk (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006b; 
Foos et al., 2010). 
 
In order to rule out the hypothesis that our results might be driven by the sovereign debt crisis, 
we remove the GIIPS countries from our sample, as they were the most affected by this crisis. 
If our baseline model is robust, we should observe, ceteris paribus, a reduction in banking risk 
in non-GIIPS countries. In the non-GIIPS subsample (Table 5), the Centralised Supervision 
dummy is still statistically significant for both dependent variables, suggesting that credit risk 
exposure of SSM supervised banks located in non-GIIPS countries has reduced in comparison 
to the financial institutions monitored by NSAs. This result supports the reliability and 
robustness of our baseline model. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Banking Union has been the most transformative supervisory reform in the European 
banking system. The ECB, through the SSM, directly supervises 117 banks in 19 countries, 
whereas the NSAs continue to supervise the remaining part of their respective national banking 
system. By drawing on the theoretical models that analyse the benefits of centralised 
supervision over decentralised supervision (Agarwal et al., 2014; Carletti et al., 2020), and on 
the extensive strand of literature that has shown that the quality of the supervisory function is 
an important determinant of bank risk (Barth et al. 2004; Buch and DeLong, 2008; Maddaloni 
and Peydro, 2011; Shehzad and De Haan, 2015) we study the effects of the European Banking 
Union on bank credit risk. We analyse a sample of 746 European banks over the period 2011-
2018 by means of a DiD methodology to distinguish the banks that are under the SSM central 
supervision from those that are still supervised by NSAs. 
 
We provide empirical evidence that banks supervised directly by the SSM have reduced their 
credit risk exposures more than their nationally supervised peers after the establishment of the 
Banking Union and the introduction of the SSM. This finding is in line with the literature that 
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studies the benefits of centralized banking supervision (De Larosière, 2009; Agarwal et al., 
2014; Carletti et al., 2020). Our results shed light on the superior effectiveness of centralised 
supervision compared to a decentralised model in the European context. The alignment of the 
policy objectives of the supervisory authorities in Europe and the centralised mandate under 
which the NSAs operate guarantee the effectiveness of SSM supervision and allows the ECB 
to achieve its policy objectives in terms of reduction in credit risk (ECB, 2016; Enria, 2019).  
 
In light of our findings, we argue that an even more integrated banking supervision might 
further enhance the stability and the soundness of the European banking system, enabling the 
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Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the average growth of Loan Loss Provisions / Gross Loans (LLP_GL) and Loan Loss 
Reserves / Gross Loans (LLR_GL) among treated banks (blue line) and non-treated banks (red dashed line) from 
2011–14. In the pre-treatment period, correlation among the treatment and control group is: 0.9021 for LLP_GL 
and 0.8657 for LLR_GL, indicating that the parallel trend assumption holds. 
Notes: LLP_GL is the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross loans.  LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss reserves-to-










Number of banks by bank specialisation and supervisor. 
Note: FHC means Financial Holding Companies. NSA indicates National Supervisory Authorities. SSM is the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
  
Panel A         Panel B       
Descriptive statistics divided by specialisation and 
country   
Descriptive statistics divided by supervisor and 
country 
  Specialisation       Supervisor     
Country FHC 
Credit 
Institutions Total   Country NSA SSM Total 
Austria 3 95 98   Austria 93 5 98 
Belgium 4 32 36   Belgium 29 7 36 
Cyprus 1 25 26   Cyprus 24 2 26 
Estonia 1 6 7   Estonia 4 3 7 
Finland 1 17 18   Finland 17 1 18 
France 6 109 115   France 107 8 115 
Germany 11 99 110   Germany 98 12 110 
Greece 1 6 7   Greece 3 4 7 
Ireland 1 9 10   Ireland 7 3 10 
Italy 3 96 99   Italy 89 10 99 
Latvia 0 14 14   Latvia 11 3 14 
Lithuania 0 5 5   Lithuania 3 2 5 
Luxembourg 3 60 63   Luxembourg 56 7 63 
Malta 1 7 8   Malta 5 3 8 
Netherlands 9 28 37   Netherlands 33 4 37 
Portugal 4 21 25   Portugal 22 3 25 
Slovakia 1 9 10   Slovakia 7 3 10 
Slovenia 0 8 8   Slovenia 5 3 8 
Spain 3 47 50   Spain 38 12 50 
Overall 53 693 746     651 95 746 
42 
 
Table 2                       
Descriptive statistics of control and treatment group prior to and after the introduction of the Banking Union. 
  Treatment (SSM)                   
Variables Pre-Banking Union         Banking Union Period       
   Obs   Mean  St.Dev   min   max   Obs   Mean  St.Dev   min   max 
Panel A: Bank Credit Risk and Overall Risk                   
LLR_GL 323 5,00%*** 4,60% 0,00% 24,72%   337 4,60% 4,90% 0,00% 24,50% 
LLP_GL 345 1,20%*** 2,10% -3,20% 9,75%   356 0,60% 1,30% -3,30% 9,80% 
Z-Score 352 2,75*** 1,42 -4,21 5,82   369 2,99*** 1,13 0,11 6,00 
NPL Ratio 74 -2,73% 0,97% -4,88% -0,43%   146 -3,20% 0,98% -6,12% -0,54% 
Panel B: Bank Balance Sheet                       
Funding Structure 349 50,40%*** 21,10% 0,37% 91,90%   368 56,40%** 20,20% 0,40% 90,10% 
Asset Structure 352 56,10%*** 22,60% 0,41% 98,00%   369 54,97%* 21,10% 0,40% 93,10% 
Size 352 17,48*** 1,74 11,30 19,62   372 17,44*** 1,68 11,31 19,59 
Profitability 352 0,19%*** 1,72% -3,92% 14,80%   369 0,54%* 1,36% -3,89% 14,55% 
Capitalization 352 7,46%*** 7,13% 1,59% 88,02%   369 8,89%*** 7,92% 1,98% 87,62% 
Panel C: Macroeconomic Variables                       
GDP 380 0,72% 2,70% -9,13% 8,56%   380 2,71%*** 2,56% -0,44% 25,16% 
Saving Propensity 380 24,97% 9,10% 8,33% 52,35%   380 27,38% 10,23% 10,27% 57,08% 
Inflation 372 1,78% 1,23% -1,31% 4,98%   372 0,93% 0,97% -1,74% 3,72% 
  Control (NSAs)                   
Variables Pre-Banking Union         Banking Union Period       
   Obs   Mean  St.Dev   min   max   Obs   Mean  St.Dev   min   max 
Panel A: Bank Credit risk and Overall Risk                   
LLR_GL 1397 4,40%*** 4,70% 0,00% 23,70%   1538 4,70% 5,50% 0,00% 24,50% 
LLP_GL 1866 0,96%*** 2,00% -3,30% 9,86%   1972 0,70% 1,80% -3,30% 9,80% 
Z-Score 2121 3,13*** 1,29 -2,72 6,21   2211 3,27*** 1,23 -2,03 6,00 
NPL Ratio 86 -2,80% 0,92% -4,79% -1,05%   182 -3,29% 1,05% -6,22% -1,07% 
Panel E: Bank Balance Sheet                       
Funding Structure 1998 56,04%*** 27,00% 0,90% 92,70%   2082 59,01%** 26,30% 0,40% 91,60% 
Asset Structure 2062 53,20%*** 27,50% 0,40% 98,00%   2165 53,16%* 26,70% 0,75% 96,00% 
Size 2158 13,95*** 2,19 8,96 19,59   2412 13,99*** 2,13 8,96 18,65 
Profitability 2145 0,57%*** 1,98% -3,92% 14,55%   2244 0,69%* 2,00% -3,85% 13,45% 
Capitalization 2140 14,30%*** 17,64% 1,59% 87,62%   2226 14,51%*** 17,25% 1,43% 87,34% 
Panel F: Macroeconomic Variables                       
GDP 2604 0,69% 2,04% -9,13% 8,56%   2604 2,21%*** 1,64% -0,44% 25,16% 
Saving Propensity 2604 25,39% 8,94% 8,33% 52,35%   2604 27,10% 9,33% 10,27% 57,08% 
Inflation 2508 1,83% 1,02% -1,31% 4,98%   2508 0,97% 0,79% -1,74% 3,72% 
Note: LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss reserves-to-gross loans. LLP_GL is the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross loans. 
NPL ratio is the natural logarithm of the ratio between non-performing loans and total gross loans. Z-Score is the number on 
a logarithmic scale of standard deviations that the bank's profitability (ROA) have to fall below the average for the bank to 
become insolvent. Funding structure is the ratio of total bank customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio 
bank gross loans-to-total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Profitability is the return on assets, which 
is the yearly net income-to-total assets ratio. Capitalization is the ratio of equity-to-total assets. GDP is the growth rate of the 
gross domestic product. Saving propensity is the ratio domestic savings-to-GDP. Inflation is the rate of increase in prices for 
goods and services. T-test difference in means between Mean treatment and Mean control prior and after the European 






































Notes: This table displays difference-in-differences regression results. LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss reserves-to-gross loans. LLP_GL is the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross 
loans. The Centralised Supervision dummy is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been supervised by 
SSM after the Banking Union implementation, 0 otherwise. Funding structure is the ratio of total bank customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio bank gross 
loans-to-total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Profitability is the return on assets, which is the yearly net income-to-total assets ratio. Capitalization is the 
ratio of equity-to-total assets. GDP growth is the rate of change of the gross domestic product. Saving propensity is the ratio domestic savings-to-GDP. Inflation is the rate of 
increase in prices for goods and services. Robust standard errors clustered at bank-level are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels:  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 3             
The effect of the Banking Union on LLR_GL and LLP_GL   
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
 
LLR_GL LLP_GL LLR_GL LLP_GL LLR_GL LLP_GL LLR_GL LLP_GL 
Centralised Supervision -0.0094*** -0.0051*** -0.0089*** -0.0040** -0.0057** -0.0027* -0.0082*** -0.0032** 
  (0.0031) (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0015) 
Funding Structure    0.0095 -0.0056* 0.0074 -0.0037 0.0074 -0.0053* 
     (0.0082) (0.0029) (0.0084) (0.0029) (0.0084) (0.0029) 
Asset Structure    0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0031 
     (0.0095) (0.0028) (0.0094) (0.0028) (0.0086) (0.0028) 
Size    -0.0009 -0.0008** -0.0012 -0.0008** -0.0017 -0.0009** 
     (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0004) 
Profitability    -0.0049*** -0.0048*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** -0.0051*** -0.0047*** 
     (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0008) 
Capitalization    0.0007** -0.0001 0.0006** -0.0000 0.0006** -0.0001 
     (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
GDP           0.0015*** -0.0008*** 
           (0.0006) (0.0002) 
Saving Propensity          -0.0019*** -0.0001 
           (0.0007) (0.0002) 
Inflation          -0.0031** -0.0018** 
           (0.0015) (0.0008) 
Observations 3,048 3,331 2,996 3,277 2,996 3,277 2,861 3,146 
R-squared 0.267 0.141 0.359 0.175 0.342 0.180 0.364 0.167 
Number of banks 487 527 480 520 480 520 456 497 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Country*Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO 
  
Table 4           
Robustness checks           
  Panel A. Credit and Overall Risk   Panel B. Fictitious Banking Union 
  [1] [2]   [3] [4] 
 NPL Ratio Z-Score 
 
LLR_GL LLP_GL 
            
Centralised Supervision -0.3111** 0.1028*** 
 
-0.0026 -0.0008 




     
Observations 452 4,044 
 
3,655 4,077 
R-squared 0.485 0.0874 
 
0.388 0.162 
Number of banks 115 658 
 
457 498  
Country Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
            
  Panel C. EU, no Germany   Panel D. EU, no France 






     
Centralised Supervision -0.0097*** -0.0032* 
 
-0.0093*** -0.0038** 




     
Observations 2,465 2,682 
 
2,274 2,548 
R-squared 0.314 0.146 
 
0.464 0.188 
Number of banks 384 416 
 
363 403 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Note: Panel A displays difference-in-differences regression results of NPL ratio, which is the natural logarithm of the 
ratio between non-performing loans and total gross loans, and Z-Score, which is the number of standard deviations 
that the bank's profitability (ROA) have to fall below the average for the bank to become insolvent. Panel B displays 
difference-in-differences regression results of Loan Loss Reserves ratio and Loan Loss Provision ratio with 
“fictitious” Banking Union dummy in 2012. Panel C displays difference-in-differences regression results of Loan 
Loss Reserves ratio and Loan Loss Provision ratio for a sub-sample, which considers Euro-area banks except those 
located in Germany. Panel D displays difference-in-differences regression results of Loan Loss Reserves ratio and 
Loan Loss Provision ratio for a sub-sample, which considers Euro-area banks except those located in France. LLR_GL 
is the ratio of loan loss reserves-to-gross loans. LLP_GL is the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross loans. The 
interaction dummy is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if bank i 
in country j has been supervised by SSM after Banking Union implementation, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors 










Table 5     
The effect of the Banking Union on non-GIIPS countries  
  [1] [2] 
  LLR_GL LLP_GL 
    
Centralised Supervision -0.0081*** -0.0046** 
  (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Funding Structure 0.0006 -0.0013 
  (0.0091) (0.0041) 
Asset Structure -0.0129 -0.0053 
  (0.0106) (0.0037) 
Size -0.0020 -0.0011** 
  (0.0014) (0.0005) 
Profitability -0.0054*** -0.0035*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0011) 
Capitalization 0.0010*** -0.0002 
  (0.0004) (0.0002) 
GDP  -0.0004 -0.0008 
  (0.0010) (0.0005) 
Saving Propensity 0.0002 -0.0000 
  (0.0005) (0.0002) 
Inflation -0.0007 -0.0022** 
  (0.0016) (0.0010) 
  
  
Observations 1,877 2,099 
R-squared 0.348 0.091 
Number of banks 305 337 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
Note: Table 5 displays difference-in-differences regression results of Loan Loss Reserves ratio and Loan Loss Provision 
ratio for CORE sub-sample, which considers Euro-area banks except GIIPS ones (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland). LLR_GL is the ratio of loan loss reserves-to-gross loans. LLP_GL is the ratio of loan loss provision-to-gross 
loans. The Centralised Supervision dummy is the interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes 
the value 1 if bank i in country j has been supervised by SSM after Banking Union implementation, 0 otherwise. Funding 
structure is the ratio of total bank customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio bank gross loans-to-total 
assets. Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Profitability is the return on assets, which is the yearly net 
income-to-total assets ratio. Capitalization is the ratio of equity-to-total assets. GDP growth is the rate of change of the 
gross domestic product. Saving propensity is the ratio domestic savings-to-GDP. Inflation is the rate of increase in 
prices for goods and services. Robust standard errors clustered by banks in parenthesis. Significance levels:  ***, **, * 









    
Timeline of the key steps of European Banking Union 
Event Data Description 
25 February 2009 De Larosière propose a report that underlines the importance of a centralized 
system of regulation and supervision. 
29 June 2012 At the Euro area summit, Governments decide to assign supervisory tasks to the 
European Central Bank (ECB) within a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
12 September 2012 The European Commission presents legislative proposals and formulates a road 
map towards a banking union. 
23 October 2013 The ECB starts the comprehensive assessment. 
3 November 2013 The SSM Regulation enters into force and states that the ECB assumes its full 
supervisory tasks on 4 November 2014. 
4 September 2014 The ECB publishes the list of the significant credit institution. 





Table A2         
Explanatory variables          
Classification Explanatory variables Expected signs Data source References 
Bank-specific variables         
Funding Structure Total Customer Deposit / Total Assets (%) (-) BankFocus Laeven et al. (2015)  
Asset Structure Loan / Total Assets (%) (-) BankFocus Altunbas et al.(2007)  
Size Natural log of Total Assets (-) BankFocus Baghat et al. (2013)  
Profitability Return on Assets (%) (-) BankFocus Poghosyan and  Čihak (2011) 
Capitalization Equity / Total Assets (%) (+) BankFocus Gambacorta and Shin (2015) 
Macroeconomic variables 
        
GDP Annual real GDP growth rate (%) (+/-) 
World 
Bank 
Poghosyan and Čihak 
(2011); Guidara et al. 
(2013) 
Saving Propensity Gross Domestic Savings / GDP (%) (-) 
World 
Bank Festic et al. (2011)  
Inflation  Annual average rate change in CPI (%) (-) 
World 










































The international reserves path, evidence from  





Given the importance Swap lines played during the coronavirus-induced crisis, this paper analyses 
the impact of temporary U.S. dollar liquidity arrangements (swap lines) on international reserves (IR). 
Specifically, I investigate the effect that the Federal Reserve (FED) swap lines have had on the 
accumulation of IR of those countries involved compared to those countries that do not have any type 
of liquidity arrangements with the FED. By analysing a sample of 47 countries over the period 2002-
2018 and a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that, overall, there is no difference in the 
accumulation process of IR between those countries that were involved in the global financial crisis 
(GFC) swap lines and those that were not. However, on close inspection, by analysing the emerging 
market economies (EME) sub-sample, I find empirical evidences that these countries - involved in 
swap lines by FED, when these GFC arrangements expired - started to accumulate reserves to a 
greater extent to the other considered EME. Furthermore, when I investigate whether these 
divergences are due to ultra-easy monetary policies or turbulence periods, I find this greater 
accumulation to be a phenomenon clearly wanted by the countries involved. This result suggests that 
swap lines involved countries that do not believe in the benevolence of Fed operations, and being 
more exposed to dollar shocks than other EME, they need a higher stockpile of IR. My contribution 
could suggest that EME will continue to follow their precautionary patterns, also after the last 
coronavirus swap lines. 
  
Keywords: International reserves; financial crises; US dollar shortage; central bank swap lines; 
Difference-in-Differences 






1. Introduction and overview 
As the level of globalization has risen, numerous crises have hit emerging market economies (EMEs). 
Tequila Mexican crisis in 1995; East Asia in 1997; Russia in 1998; Turkey in 2001, Argentina in 
2002 and 2018 are noteworthy examples. A common feature for all of them is the capital sudden stop 
and reserve capital flows, which have strongly affected the domestic economic and financial systems. 
After these first crisis episodes, several EME, particularly in the Southeast Asian region, have started 
to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. Figure 1 depicts the abnormal amount of international 
reserves (IR) accumulated after the 1990s. Specifically, the Asian crisis in late 1990s is considered 
the turning point of this phenomenon, thereafter several researches studied the motivations behind 
this buildup of IR. The latter could be considered as a defense tool against shock. They are a useful 
instrument against market turbulence, as also evidenced in the last global financial crisis (GFC) in 
2007/2008, IR constitute the first line of defense (IMF, 2011). The reasons for the accumulation of 
reserves can change over time and vary from country to country (Ghosh et al., 2012).  
Although there are several theories considering the massive accumulation of IR by central banks in 
the EME, the most important explanations are only two, namely the neo-mercantilist (export-led 
strategy) and the precautionary (self-insurance) theories.   
The IMF (2010) points out that the buildup of IR due to mercantile motives is not an objective but 
only a consequence of the export-led growth strategy. After the Asian financial crisis, some countries 
in that region began to accumulate IR in order to prevent a hypothetical appreciation of the exchange 
rate as an undervalued exchange rate allows them to become net exporters (Dooley et al., 2004; 
Palley, 2007). An undervalued exchange rate can stimulate exports (Ghosh and Kim, 2009) as it helps 
export competitiveness (Rodrik, 2008). Since maintaining competitiveness is important, the IR 
accumulation process is necessary to keep both the exchange rate undervalued and an external surplus 
(Delatte and Fouquau, 2012). The export-led growth strategy requires a persistent surplus in the 
current account, and at the same time either an increase in gross capital inflows or a reduction in gross 
capital outflows (Bernanke, 2005). Bernanke (2005) argues that the export-led strategy is not merely 
the devaluation of the exchange rate, but there is a mix of factors, among which the feature that in 
Asia there is a constant and large "saving glut"1. Dooley et al. (2009) highlight some similarities with 
the Bretton Woods system in which, after WWII, some countries (Europe and Japan) pursued a 
development strategy based on the export-led growth. However, regarding the IR accumulation, 
 




supporting this mercantilist theory with empirical evidence is problematic, as researchers found only 
a little proof with respect to the mercantile motives (among others, Obstfeld et al., 2010; Ghosh et 
al., 2012).  
On the other hand, several authors argue that the precautionary theory is better able to clarify a large 
amount of IR since the Asian crisis (Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Obstfeld et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 
2019). The devastating Asian crises showed that EME are vulnerable and cannot trust on the support 
of the IMF and the other supranational institutions (Feldstein, 1999), in this perspective IR constitute 
a war chest of international liquidity (Bernanke, 2005). In the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
it is necessary a long-term investment that should be undertaken before a probable liquidity shock 
occurs. In particular, EME are characterized by the less developed financial system, weak currencies 
and poor financial integration, which is why they are more vulnerable to financial crises (Fischer, 
2001). The EME need an adequate liquidity level to intervene in case of disorderly market conditions 
(IMF, 2008), since they are more exposed to capital account shocks and speculative attacks. IR could 
be used to prevent and mitigate a likelihood of a sudden stop (Calvo et al, 2008) and can be 
worthwhile to smooth financial cycles (Hofmann et al., 2019), while Obstfeld et al (2010) suggest 
that IR should be used to protect the domestic capital markets, since residents tend to put their capital 
abroad in a crisis event in EME with poor IR (Alberola et al., 2016). In support of precautionary 
motives, Aizenman and Lee (2007) underline that trade openness and external financial shocks are 
two factors statistically significant when they try to explain the hoarding of IR. 
 
Analysing their composition, Aizenman et al. (2019) highlight how the GFC was a watershed for the 
IR. The GFC has strongly affected the U.S. dollar funding market both in the United States and abroad 
and the result was a shortage of dollar liquidity. Obstfeld et al. (2009) show that - owing to this lack 
of liquidity - EME widely used their IR and exploited IR to stabilize their weak domestic currencies 
(Dominguez et al., 2012). Although, the GFC shows that EME are more sensitive to financial shocks 
(Shin and Turner, 2015), Arslan and Cantù (2019) provide evidence that EME with more IR showed 
lower currency depreciation during the crisis.  
Since 2007, to address this issue of liquidity, the Federal Reserve (FED) established temporary U.S. 
dollar liquidity arrangements (swap lines) with central banks of several advanced countries. This has 
not been a new program, since the FED has established similar arrangements since the 1960s for 
foreign exchange market intervention (Hooyman, 1993), and during the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Kos, 
2001). All the previous programs have been established with advanced countries2, however, the new 
 




innovative factor during the GFC was that at the end of October 2008, the Fed provided $ 30 billion 
swap lines to four emerging countries (Brazil, Mexico, Singapore and South Korea) (Bernanke, 
2009). These new agreements could create a precedent which these countries could rely on.  
Apart from a short lines window with advanced countries during the European debt crisis, swap lines 
appeared again in 2020, when COVID-19 (Coronavirus) pandemic triggers off a new economic and 
financial crisis. Since Coronavirus has spread to the United States, the domestic stock market has 
fallen more than 30 % while the VIX index3 has rapidly increased (Fleming et al., 2020). While the 
source of the crisis is different than that of the GFC, their outcomes are similar: there has been a lack 
of dollar liquidity at worldwide level. The Fed has used both conventional and unconventional policy 
tools to deal with the economic and financial disruptions caused by the pandemic. Among various 
measures4, in March the FED has established temporary swap lines with all the same countries 
involved in the previous GFC arrangements. In this case, the provision towards EME is double, 
respectively each country can rely on $ 60 billion lines. 
Stressing the previous key role played by the FED, for the aforementioned arrangements several 
authors suggest that the FED engages in swap lines as international lender of last resort (ILOLR) 
(Obstfeld et al., 2009; McDowell, 2012; Bahaj and Reis, 2018).  
Concerning the GFC swap lines, Aizenman et al. (2011) write an article titled “International Reserves 
and Swap Lines: Substitutes or Complements?”. The point is that with the swap lines the FED 
provides the international liquidity needed in the event of crisis, therefore, centrals banks could 
decrease the stockpile of IR if swap lines would provide the needed liquidity in case of crisis.  
The challenge is to understand if EME countries involved in swap lines trust in the FED intervention 
in the event of crisis. Differently to Aizenman et al. (2011), the aim of this paper is to address if EME 
actually rely on the FED intervention. Thus, the aim of this paper is not to assess if swap lines are a 
substitute of IR, but to identify the impact that swap lines have on them.  
In order to understand the future path of IR, this research exploits the setting created by a unique 
natural experiment, namely the swap lines arrangements during the GFC. Although there are other 
examples of swap lines provided by the FED, there is a marked difference among them because the 
older swap lines were meant to intervene on exchange rates while those established during the GFC 
and Coronavirus have the sole objective of providing money market liquidity (Fleming and Klagge, 
2010). These new agreements have been unprecedented and innovative. In a nutshell, taking into 
account the purpose of the new bilateral agreements, I would like to clearly trace the effect of 
 
3 It is the CBOE volatility index, also called fear gauge. 






unanticipated swap lines on the IR, emphasizing that in my study swap lines constitute an external 
shock. 
In order to identify the potential effect of the Coronavirus swap lines on IR, I use a backward-looking 
approach. The purpose of the 2008 and 2020 swap lines is identical, both are intended to compensate 
for the lack of dollar liquidity and the counterparties involved are the same. Therefore, I use a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology applied to the GFC lines swap to understand the 
potential future IR movements of those EMEs involved by the Fed in the aftermath of the coronavirus 
liquidity arrangements. Although my analysis is aimed at EMEs, for illustrative purposes only, I also 
use a dataset with advanced and emerging countries. Therefore, the subsample of interest is the one 
relating to EMEs. I split my sample between countries involved in swap lines and not, respectively 
treated and control groups. To the extent that these two groups did not present systematic differences 
in terms of IR accumulation before 2008, I can identify the average "treatment" effect of swap lines, 
as an exogenous shock, on IR. To preview my main findings, the results of the whole sample indicate 
that overall the IR path by advanced and emerging countries does not change after the swap lines. 
However, additional analysis shows that the EME involved in swap lines by the FED have not 
decreased their trend of IR accumulation after that these programs expired, moreover, they further 
increase their IR level at a higher rate than other EME.  
The dichotomy in the results of my entire sample and sub-sample are consistent with Aizenman et al. 
(2019), where it is shown that advanced countries and EME have a different IR accumulation 
behavior. In fact, the former use IR for foreign exchange interventions (Goldberg et al., 2013), while 
the latter use IR for precautionary and mercantilist purposes (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Aizenman 
and Lee, 2007). My results support the Aizenman et al. (2011) hypothesis, which assert that swap 
lines should not be considered an IR substitute, because only countries with preexisting strong 
financial and trade relationship can rely on some sort of dollar liquidity arrangements by the FED. 
However, these linkages could also constitute a source of vulnerability. As declared by the FED 
Chairman Greenspan in a FOMC meeting5, the swap lines have been a necessary tool used by the 
FED to guarantee the safety and soundness of the domestic financial system, they thus were used for 
the sole purpose of preserving the stability of the United States. Therefore, the aim of this research is 
 






to prove that the FED is not benevolent, whereas Brazil, Mexico and South Korea are more exposed 
to dollar shocks than other EME. 
It is also important to take into consideration the macroeconomic environment. After the GFC, central 
banks of advanced economies followed an unconventional monetary policy, including quantitative 
easing. These ultra-easy policies spilled out numerous effects on EME, such as deep capital inflows 
and lower international interest rates. On the one hand, the capital inflows phase could appreciate 
EME currencies, while the normalization phase could generate sudden outflows and speculative 
attacks on weak and volatile currencies. Capital flow is characterized by its skewness, where inflows 
are usually slow and require time, on the contrary, outflows are sudden and acute. On the other hand, 
these accommodative policies push huge capitals towards EME, making the IR accumulation process 
easier. I develop further robustness checks to underline that the highest observed accumulation rate 
is not a by-product of ultra-easy policies, in fact even with further explanatory variables my previous 
results do not change. 
Although, after the GFC, all EME began to accumulate IR heavily to preserve their economies, swap 
lines received economies (Brazil, Mexico and South Korea) showed a more marked trend, 
furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the accumulation of IR in the latter countries is not only 
a by-product of the capital inflows. 
The accumulation of IR in Brazil began before the GFC and continued thereafter. During that period, 
the Brazilian real continued to appreciate, as IR buying auctions had the only aim to raise the IR level 
(Central Bank of Brazil, 2019). The report of the Brazilian central bank (2019) highlights that EME 
prefer a precautionary approach as supranational institutions have demonstrated their inability to 
provide sufficient timely liquidity during the GFC, which is perhaps why Brazil never used its FED 
lines. 
On the other hand, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mexico clearly argues that FED swap lines 
or other liquidity arrangements cannot be considered an IR substitute, but they could only play a 
complementary role (Calafell, 2019). During the GFC, the last swap lines used by Mexico expired on 
January 12, 2010 as the FED program was at an end, while less than one month later, in February 
2010, the Mexican central bank launched monthly auctions in U.S. dollars with the aim of increase 
the IR as deemed insufficient. This underlines the cleared goal of Mexico to increase its IR. 
Santiago (2019) asserts that: “the credibility of reserves in the eyes of financial markets is ultimately 




lines is determined by the credibility of the central bank providing the liquidity support”. In this spirit, 
since 2008 Korea started to disclose the currency composition and the management process of its IR 
(Bank of Korea, 2019). Even though, during the GFC the FED swap lines helped the Korean central 
bank to overcome the currency pressure and to stabilize the domestic situation (Aizenman et al., 2011; 
Baba and Shim, 2010; Bank of Korea, 2019), as pointed out by Arslan and Cantú (2019), the swap 
lines are characterized by a high level of selectivity, an uncertainty linked to the times and which are 
not managed by the country that needs them. For the aforementioned questions, as suggested by 
Rossini et al. (2019), IR remain a mandatory tool to overcome the problem of the lack of a U.S. 
dollar-based lender of last resort, especially for dollarized economies. 
I provide evidence that EME do not trust the Fed as an international lender of last resort. These 
countries do not believe in the benevolence of the Fed operations. The EME will continue to follow 
their precautionary patterns, and this is also owing to the characteristics of these swap lines. On the 
one hand, in 2013 the swap lines with 5 central banks of advanced countries6 were converted by the 
FED from temporary to permanent standing arrangements, moreover, they have not any amount caps; 
on the other hand, some EME have been involved for a shorter period and for an exceptional lower 
amount. Analysing the differences among swap lines, it is understandable the reason why EME 
cannot rely on the FED for their dollar liquidity needs. EME involved in swap lines by the FED have 
only beneficed of temporary arrangement and these swap lines extended up to $ 30 billion and $ 60 
billion, respectively in the 2008 and 2020 agreements. These outstanding swap amounts ranges 
between 4 and 10 times less the IR of the EME involved, moreover, Brazil and Singapore never used 
their lines. Obstfeld et al. (2009) argue that, in light of the IR stockpile, swap lines with EME have 
been largely symbolic. While the temporary nature and limited quantity of these agreements mean 
that they are not a valid substitute for IR, furthermore, according to Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) 
and Aizenman et al. (2011), these EME have definitively understood that they have been involved in 
swap lines only for their high levels of liabilities and claims in dollars, in order to avoid negative 
spillover in the U.S. economy. Analysing the currency composition of IR, Aizenman et al. (2019) 
provide evidence that EME central banks tend to hold a larger share of the currency of that country 
with which they have a stronger trade linkage and a greater amount of debt securities outstanding in 
that currency. In the last decade, Korea peaked 70.3% of its IR denominated in dollars, 82.3% in 
Brazil, while it is still predominant in Mexico. The financial and trade sectors of these EME were and 
continue to be heavily based on U.S. dollars, these links could be a source of vulnerability in the event 
of a crisis. For the aforementioned reasons when the swap lines expired in 2010, the EME concerned 
 




have started to accumulate IR again and a higher rate based on these vulnerabilities, therefore being 
Brazil, Mexico and Korea involved again, so it might be reasonable to expect to observe similar 
behavior when the Coronavirus swap lines expire. 
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several ways. I contribute to the academic literature 
related to IR, in particular that relating to the precautionary self-insurance motives. Although, several 
papers analyse the change on IR accumulation before and after the GFC, the literature that has 
analysed the causal impact of swap lines on IR is scarce. I analyse the impact that an exogenous shock 
has on IR. Specifically, I analyse the impact of a temporary liquidity arrangement made by the issuer 
of the world key currency. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reports some historical stylized facts about the FED swap 
lines. Section 3 provides information related to methodology and data. The empirical results are 
reported in Section 4, while further robustness checks are shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
2. The FED swap lines: some stylized facts  
Although swap lines could appear as a modern and innovative instrument, they have almost a 
centenary history. The FED entered in temporary swap lines with other central banks since 1936 
(Bordo et al. 2015). The aim of these primitive form of arrangements was a short-term instrument 
that anticipate a loan agreement.  
However, most similar to the swap lines that the FED has entered most recently are all those 
arrangements established since 1961. Officially, Bordo et al. (2015) set the 1961 as the year of “the 
advent of the Federal Reserve’s Swap Lines”. Even though, swap lines could appear similar, in fact 
they have totally different aims. At that time the Bretton woods system was in force, some problems 
arose when the price of gold rose in the London market. By changing conditions, the other central 
banks had incentive to exchange unwanted dollar reserves held for gold with the U.S. Treasury 
(Coombs, 1976). From the U.S side, the main problem was that outstanding dollar liabilities were 
greater than U.S. gold stocks. With the aim to preserve the confidence in the U.S. dollar, in 1962 has 
been officially established a network of reciprocal swap lines. As highlighted by Bordo et al. (2015), 
the undeclared intent of the swap lines was to preserve the U.S. gold reserves. By the end of the 
Bretton woods era, the FED has picked up 14 counterparties: At first, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland; later, Denmark, Japan, Mexico, 
Norway, and Sweden. Noteworthy is the fact that the FED refused to involve Ireland because it was 




Bretton Woods system was in place, the swap lines have succeeded in their intent to preserve the US 
gold reserves (Makin, 1971). 
With the arrival of the new era of floating exchange rates, swap lines have once again changed their 
main role. In this context, the swap lines acted as an IR substitute, as they became a tool for foreign 
exchange interventions (Hooyman, 1993). During this period, several issues related to risk sharing 
arose, in particular profits and losses on swap lines and the credibility of monetary policies. Despite 
the swap lines remained in force, after the 1981 neither the G10 central banks nor the Fed drew on 
these lines. They were also considered an outmoded tool (Bordo et al., 2015). However, in 1994, in 
this spirit the FED has also established swap lines in the North American Framework Agreement 
(NAFA), in which are involved Canada and Mexico. Canada has never used its line of $ 2 billion, 
while Mexico last drew up from these lines in 1995 (FED, 2020 a). Noteworthy is the fact that Mexico 
was the only emerging country involved by the Fed, although, it had a $ 3 billion line, at the same 
time any drawing has been subject to an approval process and for any drawing above $ 1 billion have 
been required extra guarantees (Bordo et al., 2015). 
The new era of swap lines started aftermath the 11 September terroristic attack in 20017 (Tab 1, panel 
A). They differ in nature and duration than the previous arrangements. The FED entered in swap lines 
to ensure the functioning of the worldwide financial markets and provide liquidity in US dollars (Kos, 
2001). After the terroristic attack there was a lack of dollar liquidity, for this motive the FED 
established swap lines with the ECB and Bank of England 8, $ 50 and $ 30 billion respectively. The 
highlights of these measures are the temporary nature and the aim of providing liquidity. In this case 
they expired after 30 days. 
When the GFC spread around the world, the FED intervened to provide dollar liquidity, because it 
feared that instability on the foreign money market could spill out on the United States (Bordo et al., 
2015). Fleming and Klagge (2010) divide these new swap lines arrangements in three phases (Tab 1, 
panel B). The first phase, on 12 December 2007 the FED established swap lines with the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and Swiss National Bank (SNB), respectively $ 20 and $ 4 billion. The second 
phase started after the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, on 18 September the FED 
involved Bank of Japan (BoJ), Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of Canada (BoC) in its swap lines 
program, while on 24 September is the turn of Reserve Bank of Australia, Sveriges Riksbank, Norges 
Bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. At this stage there is a huge increase in the amount of lines available, 
 
7 Check Table 1 for a detailed exposure of the Fed swap lines in the 21st century. 




which has gone from $ 24 to $ 620 billion. Finally, due to the worsening market conditions, the FED 
started the third and more aggressive phase, on 3 October the FED removed the swap line caps 
established with the ECB, BoE, SNB and BoJ. Reserves Bank of New Zealand has been involved on 
28 October 2008; however, the landmark of this last stage is that the FED further extended swap lines 
to four EME. On 29 October 2008, the FED enter in arrangements with Banco Central do Brasil, 
Banco de Mexico, Bank of Korea and Monetary Authority of Singapore for respectively $ 30 billion. 
In December, the swap outstanding reached a peak of $ 580 billion (Fleming and Klagge, 2010). All 
these arrangements were definitively concluded on February 12, 2010. 
The standby situation has been very short as the Fed returned from 9 May 2010 to enter in swap lines 
with the central banks of the five most advanced countries. The swap lines with the ECB, BoE, SNB, 
BoJ and BoC were set again for facing the European debt crisis (Tab 1, panel C). A limit of $ 30 
billion was set for the agreement with the BoC, while the other agreements had no cap. On 31 October 
2013, the FED converted the aforementioned swap lines from temporary to standing arrangements. 
 
In March 2020, the swap lines are once again considered an innovative tool (tab 1, panel D). In early 
2020, Coronavirus pandemic spreads worldwide, the Fed, among other monetary policy measures, 
eased the conditions of the permanent swap lines on March 15, while on 19 March it established a 
further nine temporary swap lines, including a six-month line of up to $60 billion to the central banks 
of Australia, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, Singapore, Sweden, and of $30 billion to those of 
Denmark, Norway and New Zealand (FED, 2020 b). 
 
3. Methodology & Data 
3.1.  Methodology  
The policy implemented by the FED in 2008 regarding swap lines is an unexpected and global 
exogenous shock on international liquidity. This paper aims to analyse its causal effect on IR. Given 
the nature of the exogenous treatment, I employ a DiD approach to study the effect of the temporary 
U.S. swap lines on foreign exchange reserves. Various macroeconomics studies utilize this 
methodology (Card and Krueger, 1994, Agarwal and Qian, 2014, Koudijs and Voth, 2014), 
specifically Chițu (2016) develops a DiD considering the IR accumulation in the scenario of the GFC. 
As an alternative, Reis and Bahaj (2018) use a DiD approach to assess the impacts of swap lines 
evaluating several factors of central banks that have been involved in swap lines and those that have 
not been. This methodology has the advantage to use a panel data set up to compare a treated group 




Specifically, I compare the effect of swap lines on IR for my treatment group, with a control group 
of advanced and emerging countries. The regression model takes the following form: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽′𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + γj  + φ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡    [1] 
Where Yj,t represents my measure of IR in country j at time t. Therefore, my dependent variable is IR, 
which is the ratio of the international reserves divided by GDP on a logarithmic scale. Treated is a 
binary variable equal to unity if country j has been involved in swap lines by the FED, and 0 
otherwise. Post is a binary variable equal to unity in the years following the establishment of swap 
lines, 0 otherwise. β1 is the coefficient of the so-called swap lines variable, which is the product of 
Treated and Post dummies, and it is the main coefficient of interest. β1 provides the average causal 
treatment effect on treated countries, therefore it represents the average difference on IR between 
countries that can rely on swap lines for their liquidity needs and countries that cannot. 𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 denotes 
my vector of control variables. I include five variables widely used in the literature, namely: Freedom 
Status (Democracy); the log ratio Broad money to GDP (Financial deepening); foreign direct 
investments divided by GDP (FDI), the log ratio Gross savings to GDP (Saving rate), exchange rate 
regime (Exchange rate). D is a further dummy variable (Advanced), which distinguishes between 
advanced and emerging countries, is equal to 1 or 0 respectively. I insert country fixed effects (γ) to 
control for unobservable country-specific characteristics that can affect IR. I also control for time-
variant shocks over the sample period on IR with year effects (φ). All regressions are estimated with 
country clustering, thus allowing for correlation in the error terms. I use robust standard errors to 
control for heteroskedasticity and dependence (Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007; 
Petersen, 2009). In line with Popov and Rocholl (2015), I do not insert stand-alone Treated and Post 
dummies in the equation [1], since their effects are already captured by γ and φ, namely country and 
year fixed effects.9 
The DiD model must satisfy the parallel trend assumption to ensure suitability to analyse the effect 
of the swap lines on IR (Bertrand et al., 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). According to the 
parallel trend assumption, changes in the dependent variables over time should be exactly the same 
in both treatment (countries with swap lines) and control groups (countries without swap lines) in the 
absence of the intervention (the introduction of the FED swap lines arrangement). Figure 2 shows 
that the dependent variables in both treated and control groups have a similar trend from 2002 to 2008 
 
9 For robustness check I re-assess DiD with a more traditional approach, that is the aforementioned equation [1] plus 




(pre-treatment period). The assumption holds since the trend lines move together before 
implementation of the swap lines arrangement in 2008. As displayed, IR trends move in the same 
direction in the pre-treatment period (correlation among the treatment and control is 0.8327)10. 
 
3.2. Data 
I construct a dataset using several sources. As gauge of the democracy, I use data from the Freedom 
House Political Rights Index (Freedom House, 2019). As for Macroeconomic traditional variables, I 
use data from International Financial Statistics (IMF). The data related to Financial and country 
characteristic variables are extracted from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and 
Statistical Data Warehouse (ECB). Exchange rate regime data are extracted from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, 
and Rogoff (2017)11. The dataset consists of 47 Countries12. As already mentioned, I further split the 
sample into 22 advanced and 25 emerging countries. Similarly to Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), I 
use the Morgan Stanley Emerging Market index (MSCI) criteria to classy countries13. I aggregate all 
Euro area countries of the sample into a single specification, considering that all of them are part of 
the Eurosystem14. The final sample consists in two groups, namely a treated group with 14 countries, 
which includes those countries that have been involved by the FED in swap lines, and a control group 
with 23 ones, which considers all those countries that do not receive any bilateral liquidity 
arrangement by the FED. The sample period ranges from 2002 to 201815. All variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and all the other control variables in both treatment 
and control groups, prior and after the establishment of the swap lines, are shown in table 2, while 
table 3 reports the descriptive statistics divided by country16. I use the ratio total reserves17 divided 
 
10 I test the parallel trend assumption on EME sub-sample, since it is my sample of interest. However, testing the full 
sample I obtain similar result. 
11 I suppose there are no changes in the exchange rate regime in 2017 and 2018. 
12 Appendix A shows country classification. 
13For the full list of countries see: 
 https://www.msci.com/market-classification 
14 I should specify that ECB’s reserves and European national central banks  IR are two different and independent grosses. 
In this paper I only consider the IR of the whole Eurosystem. The results are similar to those with all Euro area countries 
no aggregated (available upon request). 
15 I decide to start from 2002 for two main reasons. On the one hand, it is in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist 
attacks, in which a new era of swap lines begins. On the other hand, it is the year in which the euro was officially 
introduced in Europe, while previously international reserves included, among other currencies, Deutsche mark, French 
francs, Netherlands guilder. For further information on reserves composition see: 
https://data.imf.org/?sk=E6A5F467-C14B-4AA8-9F6D-5A09EC4E62A4  
16 Although my final sample includes many advanced countries, the descriptive statistics shown are related to the EME 
sub-sample since it is my main sample of interest.  




by gross domestic product (IR) as dependent variable. It is a classic measure of foreign exchange 
reserves. According to, e.g., Aizenman et al. (2007) and Obstfeld et al. (2009), I utilize the log ratio 
to avoid problems owing to the skewness in the distribution. All measures widely employed in the 
literature to assess if the reserves level is adequate or not are simply rules of thumb. Although, they 
are transparent and easily interpreted, with the great financial crisis they demonstrate to have a limited 
relevance (IMF, 2011). Nevertheless, Rodrick (2006) points out that it is necessary to find the optimal 
level of IR. According to Jeanne and Rancière (2006), I use the ratio reserves to GDP. Even though, 
the latter is not related to any risk, it is simply used as a scale factor for cross-country analysis and is 
useful to compare countries of different sizes (Aizenman et al., 2015). Several authors employ 
reserves to GDP as dependent variable (e.g., Lane and Burke, 2001; Aizenman and Lee, 2007; 
Obstfeld et al., 2009; Obstfeld et al., 2010; Aizenman and Sun, 2012; Steiner, 2013; Aizenman et al., 
2015). Obstfeld et al. (2010) demonstrate that the ratio reserves to GDP is a better indicator for 
reserves adequacy than the traditional measures. In contrast to Guidotti (1999) and Greenspan (1999), 
Obstfeld et al. (2010) provide evidence that a “sudden stop” (Calvo, 1998) is not the unique source 
of financial shock, since the domestic sources of financial instability must also be taken into account. 
As shown by Rothenberg and Warnock (2011), many sudden stops are due only in part to a foreign 
reserve capital flight as they are severely affected by a national capital flight. For the aforementioned 
reasons, we use the ratio reserves to GDP for taking into consideration the “double- drain”18 scenario.  
As reported in Table 2 panel A and C, the average value of IR before the introduction of the swap 
lines for the treatment and control groups is statistically different at the level of 1%, 2.45% and 2.78% 
respectively. On the contrary, after the swap lines there is no difference significant, this means that 
the average value is almost the same, 2.88% for the treatment and 2.86% for the control group. 
Although both categories of countries have increased their IR levels after the swap line period, the 
treatment group countries have increased their IR at a faster rate. Not only Brazil, Mexico and Korea 
accumulate IR at a higher rate, but the average value of IR after the swap lines is higher than the 
control group countries. 
Advanced country dummy. In line with Obstfeld et al. (2009) and Obstfeld et al. (2010), I add a 
dummy variable to distinguish between advanced countries and EME. Obstfeld et al. (2009) justify 
the fact that advanced countries need less IR because of their more stable banking system and also 
because they have better access to the financial market. Whereas Obstfeld et al. (2010), ceteris 
 
18 Internal drain and external drain, they are respectively related to capital flight and “sudden stops” in capital inflows 




paribus, point out that advanced countries accumulate less IR. In my full sample regression, I expect 
to observe a negative relation between advanced country dummy and IR. 
Democracy variable. Panel B and D of table 2 report descriptive statistic for the selected democracy 
variable before and after the swap lines. To capture the level of democracy of a country I use the 
Freedom House Political Rights Index (see Freedom House, 2019), which is a measure widely used 
in the economic literature (Acemoglu et al, 2005). From this dataset I take into consideration the 
“freedom status”, which ranges from 1 to 3 and distinguishes respectively among Free, Partly Free, 
and Not Free countries. According to the previous literature I suppose to observe a negative 
relationship between reserves and democracy, where autocracies have a higher incentive to 
accumulate reserves. Rodrick (2008) studies the opportunity cost to accumulate and hold reserves, 
the results are that opportunity costs could be very high especially in emerging countries and that the 
less democratic ones are less sensitive to this factor. Analysing the mercantilist strategy, Aizenman 
(2008) suggests that those countries that follow this strategy are generally less democratic than others 
and are better poised to accumulate reserves. Specifically, Son (2019) directly links reserves with 
democracy19, he finds that those autocratic countries that rely in particular on export earnings for the 
national budget have greater incentives to build up IR. This result is coherent with the mercantilist 
strategy, according to which, in order to follow this path, it is necessary a strong political coalition.  
Financial Variables. Panel B and D of table 2 report the descriptive statistics of the financial 
deepening before and after the swap lines, namely the ratio M2 divided by GDP. Several researchers 
provide evidences that development of a country’s financial sector contributes to economic growth 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2008). There are different measures of financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Inspired 
on Levine (1997) approach, Loayza et al. (2000) use broad money (M2) as a share of GDP to measure 
the domestic financial depth. The broad money in an emerging country is considered a proxy for the 
potential magnitude of capital flight. Stressing that IR provide an intervention tool against abnormal 
market conditions (IMF, 2008), IR could be considered a buffer against the “double- drain” crisis, 
that is, a scenario in which there are currency and banking problems. The ratio M2 divided by GDP 
is widely used in the literature regarding the IR (among others, Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Obstfeld et 
al., 2009; Aizenman et al., 2015)20. Obstfeld et al. (2009) highlight the importance of considering the 
size of the financial system (M2) to understand the demand for IR. The latter find a positive and 
 
19 Using Freedom House gauge as a robustness check. 
20 Among others, Frankel and Saravelos (2010) or Rose and Spiegel (2009) provide an empirical model focused on 




statistically significant relationship between M2 / GDP and IR, therefore the IR should be quite large 
if the financial system is highly developed. I use logarithmic version of financial deepening to avoid 
problems owing to the skewness in the distribution (Obstfeld et al., 2009). In summary, I use this 
variable to assess the so-called internal drain.  
Foreign direct investments to GDP (FDI)21 is the other financial variable, the descriptive statistic of 
this variable is reported in Panel B and D of table 2. It is the net FDI, namely the difference between 
FDI inflows (liabilities) and FDI outflows (assets). FDI are widely studied in economic literature. 
Analysing the 1990s Asian crisis, Krugman (2000) describes the “Fire-sale FDI”, namely the path of 
cross-border acquisition during a financial crisis. Stoddard and Noy (2015) do not find empirical 
evidence of Fire-sale FDI during a financial crisis in emerging countries, moreover, they find that a 
financial crisis affects FDI negatively. Although there could be evidence of acquisitions during a fire-
sale crisis period, Alquist et al. (2016) find that these acquisitions may be driven by short-run and 
speculative intent rather than long-run investments. Although FDI is a variable widely used in studies 
on IR, I also stress that there is no evidence of Fire-sale FDI hypothesis, since these studies provide 
evidence that in the event of a financial crisis, emerging countries have to face the reverse capital 
flow. According to precautionary motives, for those countries that rely heavily on external financing 
it is important to accumulate IR to mitigate and prevent the sudden stop and reverse capital flow 
(Feldstein, 1999; Aizenman and Lee, 2007; Calvo et al., 2008). FDI indicate a source of vulnerability, 
Broto et al (2011) exhibit that a greater stock of IR decreases the volatility of FDI net flows. Aizenman 
et al. (2014) find that FDI is a determinant of change on IR accumulation, particularly since when 
emerging countries have relaxed outflow controls (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2013). Similarly to 
Aizenman et al. (2014), I suppose to observe a negative relation between outward FDI and IR, thereby 
the sign of my control variable should be positive. I use this variable to assess the so-called external 
drain. 
Macroeconomic traditional variables. Panel B and D of table 2 report the descriptive statistic before 
and after the swap lines of the Saving rate, that is, the gross saving divided by GDP. Saving rate is an 
important variable of some of the most important economic academic researches (Ramsey, 1928; 
Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956). Saving rate is also widely used on IR studies. Analysing IR disparities 
among emerging countries, Aizenman (2008) explains that the different level of IR could be owing 
to different cross-country saving rates and that for those countries with a higher saving rate 
sterilization of IR is easier. Bernanke (2005) highlights that this phenomenon of IR accumulation has 
 
21 Differently of the other control variables, I do not use the logarithmic form of this ratio because it could be negative. 




been widely observed in those regions with a high level of domestic saving, where governments have 
channeled domestic saving to build up IR. For instance, there are evidences that an EME as China 
has overabundance of saving (Aizenman et al., 2014). Aizenman and Marion (2004) suggest that it 
is more difficult to accumulate IR for those countries with a low saving rate, the explanation is related 
to the need to use the reserve stock in the event of a fiscal crunch. A high level of savings rate leads 
to a higher level of IR in emerging countries, while national savings could have a negative impact on 
IR in advanced countries, given the best opportunities to invest in global capital market (Aizenman 
et al., 2015). Specifically, I expect to observe a positive relationship between saving rate and IR in 
the EME sub-sample. 
Country Characteristic Variables. I use a variable to identify the exchange rate regime, its 
descriptive statistic is reported in panel B and D of table n 2. Considering Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2017) dataset I divide the examined countries in 5 exchange rate regime classes, namely: no 
separate legal tender; de factor crawling peg; managed floating, freely floating and freely falling. 
Each exchange rate regime represents a different level of flexibility, where a higher index represents 
a more flexible one. Klein and Shambaugh (2008) note that EME tend to go back and forth among 
different exchange rate regimes. Aizenman et al. (2010) suggest that, according to the mercantilist 
point of view, EME in Asia adopted a flexible exchange rate during the crisis of the 1990s, while 
they later adopted a dollar-based managed exchange rate regime again. Whereas, Dooley et al. (2009) 
underline that countries such as Brazil, Korea, Russia and Turkey during the GFC managed their 
exchange rate to stimulate their exports. The exchange rate regime is particular important in EME 
because it allows to relatively absorb market pressures (IMF, 2008). Arslan and Cantú (2019) assert 
that a higher level of IR is required in those countries where the exchange rate is highly managed. 
Numerous studies highlight the importance of considering the exchange rate regime when analysing 
the behavior of IR accumulation (Frenkel, 1980; Flood and Marion, 2002). Obstfeld et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that the exchange rate regime may be a determinant of IR accumulation, however, 
this proxy is not statistically significant when considering the EME sub-sample. Whereas, Lane and 
Burke (2001) point out that the exchange rate regime is not statistically significant in any sub-sample. 
Although, I expect to observe a negative relation where countries with a more flexible exchange rate 
regime need a lower level of IR, this relationship could not be statistically significant. 
4.  Empirical results  
As specified above, advanced countries and EMEs have no similar need to hold IR, then the main 
results of interest are those related to EME since advanced countries have transparent, credible and 




accumulate IR. However, for illustrative purpose, I also report the results of the full sample, which 
includes advanced countries. 
4.1. Full sample  
[ Insert Table 4 Here] 
Results coming from equation n. 1 are shown in table 4. In the first column is represented only the 
swap lines variable, which is the interaction between dummy treated and dummy post. The coefficient 
is positive but not statistically significant, indicating that there is no statistically significant difference 
between the IR accumulation rates of those countries involved in swap lines, after that these 
arrangements have been set. The estimate appears substantially similar even when fixed effects by 
country and time have been added in the second column, aimed at considering country-specific and 
time-variant characteristics. Column 3 shows the result with advanced, democracy, financial, 
macroeconomic and country characteristic variables. At this stage, it is widely intuitive that the 
significance of the swap lines variable does not change, however, in this section my variable of 
interest is advanced country dummy. The latter splits the whole sample between advanced and 
emerging countries. Whereas the swap lines variable, like the previous cases, is not statistically 
significant, the dummy advanced is negative and statistically significant at 1 %. Namely, there is a 
statistically significant difference in the IR accumulation path between advanced and emerging 
countries, this result therefore suggests further analysis taking into account the EME subsample. The 
coefficient of democracy is positive and statistically significant, that means that less democratic 
countries have major stimulus to accumulate IR. The coefficient of FDI is positive, that is countries 
in which FDI inflows is bigger than FDI outflows are more exposed to external drains, according to 
precautionary motives those countries tend to accumulate a major stockpile of IR. Although, the sign 
of the other control variables is coherent with my expectation, being no statistically significant they 
do not represent a determinant of IR accumulation for the whole sample. 
4.2. Emerging market economies – subsample  
[ Insert Table 5 here] 
In this section, I examine the dynamics of IR accumulation in EME, which are the subjects more 
interested by this phenomenon. The baseline result is reported in table 5 column 1, in which there is 
only the swap line variable that is positive and significant. To avoid unobservable country-specific 




Column 2 shows that the swap lines variable is still positive and statistically significant. Finally, 
column 3 exhibits the result of the whole equation [1], in which democracy, financial, macroeconomic 
and country characteristic variables are also considered. The swap lines variable maintains the 
statistical significance level (albeit at the 10% level). The positivity of the swap lines variable displays 
that after the GFC swap lines the EME counterparts have started their IR accumulation process 
considerably more than other EME. Another important factor is that, with the exception of the 
exchange rate regime, all my control variables have a positive and significant relation regarding to 
IR. According to the full sample result, democracy variable is positive and significant, so this is a 
further validation that autocratic countries have a higher incentive to accumulate reserves. According 
to Obstfeld et al. (2009), the positive relation between IR and financial deepening is statistically 
significant. An EME with a quite large size of its financial system should hold a stockpile of IR to 
face an internal capital drain in the event of crisis, therefore a higher size of the financial system 
suggests a major level of IR. The relation between FDI and IR is the same of the aforesaid motives, 
net liabilities for FDI are positively related to IR, therefore the external drain is still considered a 
source of risk among those EME that accumulate IR. Saving rate variable highlights a linear 
relationship with IR, consistently with Bernanke (2005), for those countries with a major saving rate 
have been easier to channel domestic saving toward IR. According to Aizenman (2008), EME with a 
higher saving rate face less problems to sterilize IR.  
In summary, it emerges that there are empirical evidences that those countries involved in swap lines 
by FED start to accumulate reserves to a greater extent to the other EME considered, when these 
arrangements expired. Analysing the control variables, I could highlight that motives behind the 
accumulation IR process differ between advanced and emerging countries. When I consider the whole 
sample, then advanced and emerging countries together, financial deepening and saving rate variables 
are not significant, by contrast the same variables are considered two important proxy in EME sub-
sample. Moreover, as displayed in table 5, in EME sub-sample financial deepening and saving rate 
variables are significant at the 1% level. The latter finding is coherent to Aizenman et al. (2015), 
where financial deepening and saving rate show opposite paths depending if the sample involves 
advanced or emerging countries. 
5.  Robustness checks 
5.1. Ultra-easy monetary policies and fear gauge 
As highlighted by Aizenman et al. (2015), it is important to consider accommodative monetary 
policies in advanced countries, because after the GFC, quantitative easing (QE) and extremely low 




et al. (2019) highlight that it is important to distinguish between distressed and tranquil financial 
situation. With the aim of validating my previous results, I add some more explanatory variables. 
Adding GDP growth, I would evaluate whether the difference in IR accumulation between swap 
received countries and the other ones is due to cross-country growth rate differences. In a regression, 
I use the Fed's monetary policy rate22 to take into account the accommodative monetary policies of 
advanced countries, in addition, with the interaction FDI * policy rate it is possible to examine 
whether some countries experienced a higher inflow during the QE period. Whereas, in another 
regression, I use VIX23 to distinguish between turmoil and quiet times and the FDI * VIX interaction 
to evaluate whether some countries had higher outflow during a turbulent period. 
[ Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports the results with the new explanatory variables. Column 1 shows that the swap lines 
variable is still positive and statistically significant, while among the new proxy only policy rate is 
statistically significant. The negative sign of the latter indicates that the EME examined tend to 
increase their IR during a period characterized by a low monetary policy rate. In column 2 the swap 
lines variable remains positive and significant, while among the added variables VIX is the only 
statistically significant with a positive relationship, i.e. the EME increase their IR during a turmoil 
period. In light of these additional tests, I can assert that the differences in the accumulation path of 
IR after the swap lines are not due to differences between countries, since in both regressions the new 
interactions, the FDI * policy rate and the FDI * VIX, are not statistically significant, while GDP 
growth is never significant. Therefore, these results further confirm that Brazil, Mexico and Korea 
have intentionally increased their IR after the GFC swap lines because they do not rely on the Fed as 
an international lender of last resort, and it is not a merely by-product of the differences in capital 
flows. 
5.2. Propensity Score matching – Difference in Differences 
As I mentioned before, in a DiD approach the main coefficient of interest is β1, because it allows us 
to identify the average causal effect of the swap lines on IR in the treated countries after the 
implementation of the arrangements (relative to not being treated). What I need to evaluate is the 
average treatment effect on treated, which, in a DiD, is captured by the interaction variable (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2008). However, a prerogative is that the average treatment effect on treated can be 
 
22 Data are extracted from BIS statistics. 





identify only in absence of sample selection bias. For validating previous results, treatment must be 
assigned randomly. If the FED had involved some countries for some specific characteristics, the 
treatment would not have been randomly assigned, so the study would have been influenced by 
selection bias. 
In order to assess whether my previous results were due to sample selection bias, I use a different and 
larger sample. Similarly to Chițu (2016), as robustness checks, I employ a sample that includes all 
EME among the 186 IMF member countries. It is important that control group owns similar 
characteristics with treatment group, so the treatment might be somewhat random. For the 
development of further analysis on the new sample, I use propensity score matching (PSM) to 
construct a control group as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The predicted probability 
(propensity score) of swap lines to be undertaken by a country is obtained from the estimation of a 
Logit model. The PSM model could be depict as follow:  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = Pr�𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� = δ�X′𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 β + ε𝑖𝑖�                                          [2] 
where Di is a dummy variable describing the treatment status. D = 1 if a country has been involved 
by the FED, and D = 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of democracy, financial, macroeconomic and country 
characteristic variables in the two years prior to GFC swap lines and δ is a standard normal cumulative 
distribution function. As subset of observable characteristics of PSM, I use the same variables used 
in the previous estimations. Specifically, to match treated and control observations, I employ the 
nearest neighbor(s)24 algorithm (Forbes et al., 2013). The PSM model checks for systematic 
differences between treated and control group that affect outcomes, namely the sample selection bias 
is removed. These further tests are important to support the hypothesis that the previous results are 
driven by the effect of the treatment, and therefore there are not systematic differences between the 
two groups before the swap lines.  
I divided this analysis in two steps. Firstly, by using the logit regression, I estimate the propensity 
scores based on neighbor algorithm. Secondly, I construct a new sub-sample consisting of the treated 
and control countries, in which the latter are those countries considered as close as possible to the 
treated on the basis of a series of observable characteristics. 
[ Insert Table 7 here] 
 




Table 7 reports the average treatment effect on the treated, the treatment is positive and statistically 
significant. This result is a proof that all my previous estimations are not driven by systematic 
differences, but the highlighted differences in the IR accumulation behavior are due to the FED swap 
lines. 
[ Insert Table 8 here] 
The estimate from the DiD-PSM results is shown in Panel A of table 8. The new sample consists of 
102 countries and even with a larger sample the estimates rare broadly similar. Although, the 
magnitude of the swap lines variable is smaller, it is still positive and statistically significant. 
5.3. Panel average 
In the spirit of Obstfeld et al. (2010), I remove all time series identifications, that is I summarize all 
the information available in only two time periods: pre and post. On the one hand, “pre” assembles 
the averages of the pre-swap lines variables for each country, on the other hand, “post” puts together 
the averages of the variables in the after-swap lines period for the same countries. Substantially, I 
have only two observations for all variables for each country. In summary, in panel B of table 8 I 
perform my DID through the pre and post averages of the panel for each country. 
[ Insert Table 8 here] 
My results are still strikingly similar, since the swap lines variable is statistically significant at 5 % 
level. 
5.4. Placebo test 
For further validate the DiD estimation, I carry out a specific test on swap lines variable. The aim of 
this further test is to assess whether there have been other exogenous factors that have influenced IR 
accumulation path before the establishment of the GFC swap lines. To perform this experiment, I 
create a fictitious post dummy starting in 2007.  
[ Insert Table 8 here] 
The results are reported in panel C of table 8, in which the swap lines variable is not statistically 
significant while the control variables, with the exception of the exchange rate regime, are still 
positive and statistically significant. Based on this result, I can assert that the new IR accumulation 




events. Furthermore, since the GFC began in 2007, with this further test I can rule out that the starting 
point of this trend was implemented before the swap lines. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Considering the changing nature of the accumulation of international reserves, an extensive strand of 
literature has shown that the global financial crisis was a watershed for the IR (Aizenman et al., 2015; 
Aizenman et al., 2019). Noticeably, FED swap lines have been among the most important 
intervention tools during the GFC. Stressing the key role played by the FED, for the aforementioned 
arrangements several authors suggest that the FED engages in swap lines as international lender of 
last resort (Obstfeld et al., 2009; McDowell, 2012; Bahaj and Reis, 2018). It is important to emphasize 
that the swap lines, in providing dollar liquidity, play a complementary role of IR. In this research, 
by using a sample of 47 countries over the period 2002-2018 and a DiD methodology, I investigate 
the impact of FED swap lines on IR accumulation. 
 
I provide empirical evidence that advanced and emerging countries follow different patterns in the 
accumulation of IR. My results, with respect to emerging market economies subsample, empirically 
confirmed that have been structural change in IR accumulation, moreover, I find that those countries 
involved in swap lines by FED, when these GFC arrangements expired, started to accumulate reserves 
to a greater extent to the other EME.  
According to previous literature, I discover a statistically significant relationship with democracy, 
financial deepening, FDI and savings rate. Where less democratic countries tend to accumulate more 
IR, whereas EME with a fairly large size of their financial system hold a greater stockpile of IR. Net 
FDI liabilities are positively related to IR, while countries with a major saving rate hold more IR. 
Owing to the global macroeconomic scenario, EME tend to increase their IR during a period 
characterized by a low US monetary policy rate and a turmoil period. 
My analysis has important policy implications. I provide evidence that, notwithstanding the recent 
liquidity arrangements, further efforts are still required for the sake of the global economic 
architecture. Although, the FED swap lines are a useful and essential tool, the credibility of swap 
lines is determined by the credibility of the central bank providing the liquidity support, and the EME 
involved in these arrangements do not believe in the benevolence of these supports. 
In the recent Coronavirus crisis, similar arrangements have been set again with the same 
counterparties, however, until a credible ILLR is found, there is no reason to expect future stability 
in the IR accumulation path and in line with the above results, I expect that when these agreements 
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Figure 1. Figure 1 depicts the amount of international reserves (IR) accumulated after the 1990s. I 
split my sample among advanced economies (blue line), emerging market economies (red line), and 






Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the average growth of the International Reserves ratio between the treated 
countries (blue line) and the untreated countries (red dashed line) from 2002 to 2008, relative to the 
sub-sample of emerging market economies. In the pre-treatment period, correlation among the 
treatment and control is 0.8327 for IR, indicating that the parallel trend assumption holds. 





Table 1         
FED swap lines opened with Central Banks 
 Date Central bank and authorized swaps lines (billion) 
Panel A : 11 September Terroristic attack 
Phase 1 12 September 2001 European Central Bank (ECB) $ 50 
  13 September 2001 Bank of Canada (BoC) $ 10 
  14 September 2001 Bank of England (BoE) $ 30 
Phase 2 13 October 2001 All swap lines expired 
          
Panel B : Global Financial Crisis    
Phase 1 12 December 2007 ECB $20 , Swiss National Bank (SNB) $ 4 
  11 March 2008 ECB $ 30 , SNB $ 6 
  2 May 2008 ECB $ 50 , SNB $ 12 
  30 July 2008 ECB $ 55 
Phase 2 18 September 2008 ECB $ 110 , SNB $ 27, Bank of Japan (BoJ) $ 60, BoE $ 40, 
BoC $ 10 
  24 September 2008 Reserve Bank of Australia $ 10, Danmarks Nationalbank $ 5, 
Sveriges Riksbank $ 10, Norges Bank $ 5 
  26 September 2008 ECB $120 , SNB $ 30 
  29 September 2008 ECB $240 , SNB $ 60, BoJ $120, BoE $ 80, BoC $ 30, 
Reserve Bank of Australia $ 30, Danmarks Nationalbank  
$ 15, Sveriges Riksbank $ 30, Norges Bank $ 15 
Phase 3 13 October 2008 ECB, SNB, BOE without cap 
  14 October 2008 BoJ without cap 
  28 October 2008 Reserve Bank of New Zealand $ 15 
  29 October 2008 Banco Central do Brasil $ 30, Banco de Mexico $ 30, Bank 
of Korea $ 30, Monetary Authority of Singapore $ 30 
  1 February 2010 All swap lines expired 
          
Panel C : European debt crisis   
Phase 1 9 May 2010 ECB, SNB, BoJ, BoE without cap; BoC $ 30 
Phase 2 31 October 2013 ECB, SNB, BoJ, BoE, BoC converted to standing 
          
Panel D : Coronavirus     
  15 March 2020 ECB, SNB, BoJ, BoE, BoC new terms and conditions 
  19 March  2020 Reserve Bank of Australia $ 60, Danmarks Nationalbank  
$ 30, Sveriges Riksbank $ 60, Norges Bank $ 30, Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand $ 30, Banco Central do Brasil $ 60, 
Banco de Mexico $ 60, Bank of Korea $ 60, Monetary 
Authority of Singapore $ 60 





Table 2                       
Descriptive statistics of treatment and control group prior and after the introduction of the Global Financial Crisis  
Swap lines 
Variables 
Treatment                 
Pre- swap lines         After- swap lines       
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max   Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent variable                     
IR 21 2,45%*** 0,51 1,79% 3,26%   30 2,88% 0,31 2,40% 3,40% 
Panel B: Independent variables                   
Democracy 21 1,00*** 0,00 1,00 1,00   30 1,30*** 0,47 1,00 2,00 
Financial 
deepening 21 4,04% 0,63 3,22% 4,86%   30 4,30% 0,60 3,40% 5,02% 
FDI 21 1,24%** 1,28 -1,16% 3,00%   30 1,12% 1,98 -1,73% 4,08% 
Saving rate 21 3,15% 0,27 2,74% 3,56%   30 3,15% 0,33 2,60% 3,59% 
Exchange rate 21 3,24*** 0,70 2,00 5,00   30 3,13*** 0,35 3,00 4,00 
GDP 21 3,64%*** 1,89 -0,04% 7,43%   30 2,16%*** 2,66 -5,29% 7,53% 
Policy rate 21 2,76% 1,60 1,10% 5,02%   30 0,41% 0,55 0,13% 1,83% 
VIX 21 19,76 6,87 12,55 31,59   30 18,74 5,84 11,05 31,79 
  Variables 
Control                     
Pre- swap lines         After- swap lines       
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max   Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Panel C: Dependent variable                     
IR 147 2,78%*** 0,53 1,31% 4%   210 2,86% 0,71 0,80% 4,58% 
Panel D: Independent variables                   
Democracy 147 1,88*** 0,87 1,00 3,00   210 1,92*** 0,84 1,00 3,00 
Financial 
deepening 147 4,02% 0,46 3,16% 5,06%   210 4,21% 0,43 3,19% 5,31% 
FDI 133 2,23%** 2,18 -3,39% 10,12%   198 1,08% 1,83 -5,47% 7,99% 
Saving rate 133 3,23% 0,35 2,62% 3,97%   198 3,23% 0,38 2,26% 4,10% 
Exchange rate 147 2,31*** 1,10 1,00 5,00   210 2,46*** 0,84 1,00 4,00 
GDP 147 5,90%*** 3,37 -10% 17%   210 3,85%*** 3,35 -7,80% 17% 
Policy rate 147 2,76% 1,56 1,10% 5,02%   210 0,41% 0,54 0,13% 1,83% 
VIX 147 19,76 6,73 12,55 31,59   210 18,74 5,76 11,05 31,79 
Note: IR are International reserves, which is the ratio of the international reserves divided by GDP on a 
logarithmic scale. Democracy means the cross-country Freedom Status. Financial deepening is the log 
ratio Broad money to GDP. FDI means foreign direct investments divided by GDP. Saving rate is the 
log ratio Gross savings to GDP. Exchange rate depicts the different exchange rate regimes. GDP is the 
annual growth of the gross domestic product. Policy rate is the official Fed's monetary policy rate. VIX 
is the CBOE volatility index. T-test difference in means between Mean treatment and Mean control prior 
and after the FED swap lines is also reported. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.   




Table 3               
Descriptive statistics of treatment and control group divided by country     





Treatment group             
Brazil 2,517 1 4,297 2,338 2,821 3,412 2,378 
  (0,38) (0,00) (0,18) (1,16) (0,12) (0,71) (3,04) 
                
Korea, Rep.  3,205 1 4,862 -0,829 3,528 3,118 3,737 
  (0,10) (0,00) (0,11) (0,84) (0,04) (0,49) (1,67) 
                
Mexico  2,386 1,529 3,413 1,992 3,100 3 2,195 
  (0,29) (0,51) (0,16) (0,82) (0,07) (0,00) (2,33) 
                
Control group               
Argentina  2,239 1,059 3,366 1,686 2,834 1,941 2,821 
  (0,40) (0,24) (0,29) (0,72) (0,18) (0,90) (5,98) 
                
Chile  2,699 1 4,355 3,225 3,100 3 3,865 
  (0,19) (0,00) (0,07) (1,37) (0,08) (0,00) (2,26) 
                
China  2,521 3 5,148 2,239 3,861 1,529 9,221 
  (0,62) (0,00) (0,13) (1,32) (0,07) (0,51) (2,21) 
                
Colombia  2,436 2 3,641 2,555 2,845 3 4,025 
  (0,18) (0,00) (0,21) (1,09) (0,08) (0,00) (1,85) 
                
Czech Republic  3,270 1 4,217 2,744 3,233 2,882 2,799 
  (0,42) (0,00) (0,16) (2,88) (0,06) (0,33) (2,92) 
                
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2,420 2,941 4,454 2,904 2,777 1,706 4,257 
  (0,68) (0,24) (0,11) (2,71) (0,32) (0,47) (1,70) 
                
Hungary  3,122 1,059 4,017 2,042 3,023 2,588 2,303 
  (0,33) (0,24) (0,11) (1,57) (0,18) (0,51) (3,00) 
                
India  2,788 1 4,289 1,063 3,514 2,235 6,901 
  (0,14) (0,00) (0,08) (0,48) (0,08) (0,44) (1,60) 
                
Indonesia  2,499 1,529 3,702 0,981 3,329 2,647 5,390 
  (0,12) (0,51) (0,08) (0,74) (0,16) (0,79) (0,60) 
                
Malaysia  3,684 2 4,872 -0,454 3,482 2,235 5,142 
  (0,20) (0,00) (0,05) (1,68) (0,13) (1,09) (1,88) 
                
Pakistan  1,863 2,353 3,961 1,320 3,099 2 4,543 
  (0,47) (0,49) (0,08) (1,01) (0,13) (0,00) (1,77) 
                
Peru  3,221 1 3,626 3,898 3,027 2,529 5,286 




                
Philippines  3,069 1,824 4,163 0,395 3,796 2,706 5,548 
  (0,24) (0,39) (0,13) (1,09) (0,03) (0,47) (1,66) 
                
Poland  2,816 1 3,976 2,208 2,861 3 3,909 
  (0,20) (0,00) (0,18) (1,00) (0,09) (0,00) (1,54) 
                
Qatar  2,610 3 4,115 -2,925 3,962 1 8,960 
  (0,40) (0,00) (0,25) (1,85) (0,13) (0,00) (6,42) 
                
Russian Federation  3,132 2,882 3,796 -0,236 3,319 2,824 3,330 
  (0,26) (0,33) (0,27) (0,81) (0,11) (1,13) (4,16) 
                
Saudi Arabia  4,010 3 4,045 2,018 3,670 1 3,826 
  (0,81) (0,00) (0,19) (3,06) (0,24) (0,00) (3,84) 
                
South Africa  2,257 1 4,265 0,491 2,804 3,882 2,692 
  (0,38) (0,00) (0,09) (1,54) (0,06) (0,33) (1,92) 
                
Thailand  3,595 2,176 4,742 1,001 3,386 3 4,069 
  (0,20) (0,73) (0,09) (2,11) (0,06) (0,00) (2,44) 
                
Turkey  2,348 2,118 3,841 1,381 3,142 3,647 5,682 
  (0,09) (0,33) (0,17) (0,86) (0,08) (0,70) (3,75) 
                
United Arab 
Emirates  
2,744 3 4,162 . . 1 4,080 
(0,38) (0,00) (0,28) . . (0,00) (3,65) 
Note: IR is the International reserves ratio, which is the ratio of the international reserves divided 
by GDP on a logarithmic scale. Democracy means the cross-country Freedom Status. Financial 
deepening is the log ratio Broad money to GDP. FDI means foreign direct investments divided by 
GDP. Saving rate is the log ratio Gross savings to GDP. Exchange rate depicts the different 
exchange rate regimes. GDP is the annual growth of the gross domestic product. Robust standard 




Table 4       
The effect of swap lines on IR     
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IR IR IR 
        
Swap lines  0.2289 0.2289 0.2571 
  (0.1701) (0.1773) (0.1792) 
Advanced country      -1.1914*** 
      (0.2433) 
Democracy     0.1753* 
      (0.0931) 
Financial deepening     0.3104 
      (0.2026) 
FDI     0.0215** 
      (0.0097) 
Saving rate     0.5520* 
      (0.2945) 
Exchange rate     -0.0699 
      (0.0760) 
        
Observations 629 629 569 
R-squared 0.107 0.854 0.835 
Number of Countries 37 37 34 
Time Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Cluster (Country) YES YES YES 
Note: This table displays difference-in-differences regression results of IR. IR is the 
International reserves ratio, namely the ratio of the international reserves divided by 
GDP on a logarithmic scale. The Swap lines dummy is the interaction between the 
dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if country j has been involved 
in swap lines by the FED after the global financial crisis, 0 otherwise. Advanced country 
is a dummy variable that distinguishes between advanced countries and Emerging 
Market Economies. Democracy means the cross-country Freedom Status. Financial 
deepening is the log ratio Broad money to GDP. FDI means foreign direct investments 
divided by GDP. Saving rate is the log ratio Gross savings to GDP. Exchange rate 
depicts the different exchange rate regimes. Robust standard errors clustered by 
Country in parenthesis. Significance levels:  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 




Table 5       
The effect of swap lines on IR in Emerging Market Economies 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  IR IR IR 
        
Swap lines 0.4116*** 0.3787** 0.3480* 
  (0.0863) (0.1531) (0.1952) 
Democracy     0.1475* 
      (0.0796) 
Financial deepening     0.9823*** 
      (0.2386) 
FDI     0.0362* 
      (0.0205) 
Saving rate     0.8400*** 
      (0.1896) 
Exchange rate     -0.0364 
      (0.0539) 
        
Observations 425 425 399 
R-squared 0.0434 0.819 0.867 
Number of Countries 25 25 24 
Time Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Cluster(Country) YES YES YES 
Note: This table displays difference-in-differences regression results of IR.IR is the 
International reserves ratio, namely the ratio of the international reserves divided 
by GDP on a logarithmic scale. The Swap lines dummy is the interaction between 
the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if country j has been 
involved in swap lines by the FED after the global financial crisis, 0 otherwise. 
Democracy means the cross-country Freedom Status. Financial deepening is the log 
ratio Broad money to GDP. FDI means foreign direct investments divided by GDP. 
Saving rate is the log ratio Gross savings to GDP. Exchange rate depicts the 
different exchange rate regimes. Robust standard errors clustered by Country in 
parenthesis. Significance levels:  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 




Table 6     
The effect of swap lines on IR in Emerging Market Economies considering ultra-easy monetary 
policies and global fear gauge. 
  (1) (2) 
  IR IR 
      
Swap lines 0.3313* 0.3443* 
  (0.1864) (0.1907) 
Democracy 0.1493* 0.1520* 
  (0.0811) (0.0804) 
Financial deepening 1.0267*** 1.0181*** 
  (0.2413) (0.2369) 
FDI 0.0270 0.0398 
  (0.0228) (0.0377) 
Saving rate 0.7707*** 0.7795*** 
  (0.1922) (0.1945) 
Exchange rate -0.0443 -0.0420 
  (0.0568) (0.0560) 
Gdp 0.0109 0.0105 
  (0.0132) (0.0130) 
Policy rate -0.2078***   
  (0.0726)   
FDI * Policy rate 0.0043   
  (0.0067)   
VIX   0.0234** 
    (0.0095) 
FDI * VIX   -0.0002 
    (0.0016) 
      
Observations 399 399 
R-squared 0.868 0.868 
Number of Countries 24 24 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster(Country) YES YES 
Note: This table displays difference-in-differences regression results of IR. IR is the International reserves ratio, 
namely the ratio of the international reserves divided by GDP on a logarithmic scale. The Swap lines dummy is the 
interaction between the dummy Treated and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if country j has been involved in 
swap lines by the FED after the global financial crisis, 0 otherwise. Democracy means the cross-country Freedom 
Status. Financial deepening is the log ratio Broad money to GDP. FDI means foreign direct investments divided by 
GDP. Saving rate is the log ratio Gross savings to GDP. Exchange rate depicts the different exchange rate regimes. 
GDP is the annual growth of the gross domestic product. Policy rate is the official Fed's monetary policy rate. VIX 
is the CBOE volatility index. Robust standard errors clustered by Country in parenthesis. Significance levels:  ***, 








































Table 7             
Propensity Score matching estimates - Average treatment effect on the treated 
Estimator: propensity-score matching    Number of Countries = 108 
Matches: Nearest neighbour   Outcome model  : matching      
Treatment model: logit    
          
IR Coef. Rob. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interal] 
ATET             
dummy 
Treated              
(1 vs 0) 0,72794 0,35056 2,08 0,038 0,04085 1,41503 
Note: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated obtained from the 
propensity score matching estimates calculated as the difference in International 
reserves ratio between the treated and the matched control groups according to the 
nearest neighbour algorithm. IR is the International reserves ratio, namely the ratio 
of the international reserves divided by GDP on a logarithmic scale. Treated is a 






Table 8       
Robustness Checks        
  Panel A. Panel B. Panel C.  
  Propensity score matching Panel average Fictitious Swap lines 
  IR IR IR 
        
Swap lines  0.1944* 0.3494** 0.1729 
  (0.1175) (0.1473) (0.1426) 
        
Observations 1,626 47 399 
R-squared 0.205 0.401 0.864 
Number of Countries 102 24 24 
Note: Panel A displays difference-in-differences regression results of IR for Propensity score 
matching subsample. Panel B displays difference-in-differences regression results of IR 
through the pre and post averages of the panel for each country. Panel C displays difference-
in-differences regression results of IR with “fictitious” swap lines dummy in 2007. IR is the 
International reserves ratio, namely the ratio of the international reserves divided by GDP on 
a logarithmic scale. The Swap lines dummy is the interaction between the dummy Treated 
and the dummy Post. It takes the value 1 if country j has been involved in swap lines by the 
FED after the global financial crisis, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by Country 




Appendix A: Country samples 
 
Advanced countries: Australia; Canada; Denmark; Euro countries; Hong Kong SAR, China; 
Israel; Japan; New Zealand; Norway; Singapore; Sweden; Switzerland; United Kingdom.  
   
Emerging Market Economies: Argentina; Brazil; Chile; China; Colombia; Czech Republic; 
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Korea, Rep.; Malaysia; Mexico; Pakistan; Peru; 
Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia; South Africa; Thailand; Turkey; 
United Arab Emirates. 
 
Euro countries: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; 






























Banks’ Market Power, Monetary Policy Transmission and Financial Stability Risks: 




Banks’ Market Power, Monetary Policy Transmission and 
Financial Stability Risks: 





This paper investigates to what extent the introduction of negative monetary policy rates 
altered competitive conditions in the euro area banking sector. Specifically, it analyses the 
effect that negative policy rates had on euro area banks’ market power in comparison to banks 
that have not been subject to negative rates. The analysis, considering a sample of 4,223 banks 
over the period 2011–2018 and relying on a difference-in-differences methodology, finds that 
negative monetary policy rates led to an increase in euro area banks’ market power. 
Furthermore, it shows that, during the negative interest rate policy period, increased market 
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To counter the severe recession and the deflationary pressures arose during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and the sovereign debt crisis, policymakers launched an unprecedented 
accommodative monetary policy cycle.36 During this period, which has been now lasting for 
about ten years, monetary policy rates reached the zero-lower bound (ZLB). In the euro area 
the low interest rate environment reached its watershed in 2014 when the ECB was the first 
major central bank to lead its main policy rate into negative territory37 and set, after several 
reductions, the Deposit Facility rate (DF) at -0.50% in September 2019.  
It can be argued that negative interest rates can lead to changes in the behaviour of banks and 
their customers in comparison to a positive interest rate environment. Such behavioural 
changes could affect the market power of banks, which in turn may have monetary policy and 
financial stability implications. For example, a stream of literature shows that banks reshape 
their asset side flexibly when their margins are compressed by Negative Interest Rate Policies 
(NIRP). Specifically, in response to NIRP, banks adjust their sources of income (Altavilla et 
al., 2018), investment choices (Bubeck et al., 2020) and lending decisions (Heider et al., 2019). 
In this study, we investigate to what extent negative interest rates altered competitive 
conditions in the euro area banking sector. With this purpose, using a panel dataset of 4,223 
banks from 28 countries for the period between 2011 and 2018 and employing a difference-in-
differences (DiD) estimator, we examine the effects of NIRP on banks’ market power. By using 
the Lerner index, which is considered a direct measure of market power and is defined as the 
difference between banks’ marginal returns and marginal costs, the DiD approach allows to 
examine whether the NIRP led to a decline in competition in the euro area banking sector. In 
this context, we particularly investigate two research questions. First, we study the impact of 
the introduction of the NIRP on the market power of banks incorporated in the euro area 
countries with respect to the market power of banks incorporated in countries that have not 
been subject to negative monetary policy rates. Secondly, we investigate the banks’ features 
which influence how NIRP affects banks’ market power. In addressing these questions, we use 
a sample of euro area banks, our treatment group, and non-euro area banks, our control group, 
 
36 Available from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-
bulletin/articles/2020/html/ecb.ebart202003_02~4768be84e7.en.html#toc1  
37 On 5 June 2014, the ECB lowered the Main Refinancing Operation rate to 0.15% and the Deposit Facility rate 
to -0.10%. The latter is widely considered the main policy rate. 
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and control for bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables that, in previous 
studies, were shown to have an impact on market power. 
In the analysis, we find that NIRP led to an increase in the market power of euro area banks 
with respect to banks which are located in countries that did not adopt the NIRP. We also find 
that NIRP had a significant negative effect on both banks’ marginal returns and marginal costs. 
However, the effect on marginal costs was more material leading to an increase in banks’ mark-
ups.  
These results are coherent with a part of the literature which argues that banks featuring a 
“nonstandard profit function” are price-setters in the output market and price-takers in the input 
market and accordingly their interest rates on liabilities follow the policy rates closer than their 
interest rates on the assets. For example, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) assert that banks exploit 
their market power to choose output prices, so that they can differentiate output prices over 
time, across markets and customer groups; while recently Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2020) 
theoretically demonstrate that the intensity of the pass-through of policy rates to loan rates 
depends on the market power of banks. Moreover, Eggertsson et al. (2017) highlight a limited 
pass-through of changes in monetary policy rates to lending rates in a low interest rate 
environment and also assert that lending rates seem less sensitive to changes in monetary policy 
rates once the latter become negative. Furthermore, our result is also consistent with the recent 
literature which assesses the effects of the NIRP on banks’ profitability. Indeed, looking at the 
output market, where banks are price setters, and, thus, focusing on the marginal returns’ side, 
several studies provide evidence that when NIRP comes into effect banks tend to shift activities 
toward riskier lending and investment decisions (Bubeck et al., 2020, Heider et al., 2019)), tend 
to enhance fee-based services and start charging higher fees (Bottero et al., 2019; IMF, 2017; 
Kok et al., 2016; Lopez et al., 2018) offsetting to some extent the negative impact of the low 
interest rates on the net interest income (Altavilla et al., 2018; Molyneux et al., 2019, Basten 
and Mariathasan, 2018; Cœuré, 2016). Conversely, looking at the input market, where banks 
are price-takers, and, thus, focusing on the marginal costs’ side, low interest rates were shown 
to lower funding costs for financial intermediaries (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2020), and 
the NIRP was found to lower cost of non-deposit funding (Heider et al., 2019). Overall several 
studies show a significant decrease in banks’ overall funding costs after 2014 (IMF, 2021; 
ECB, 2020) and an increase in banks’ efficiency accompanied with a general reduction in costs 
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(ECB, 2017). This overall evidence is consistent with an increase in banks’ mark-ups led by a 
more material decline in marginal costs than in marginal returns. 
In this paper, we also investigate how changes in market power affected monetary policy 
transmission and financial stability in the euro area after the introduction of the NIRP. More 
specifically, we tack two further research questions. We study how the NIRP affects the 
relationship between banks’ market power and the monetary policy transmission mechanism 
and how the NIRP affects the relationship between banks’ market power and financial stability. 
We here employ a DiD approach on a sample of euro area banks to analyse the effect of NIRP 
on banks’ lending behaviour and financial stability. We compare the lending behaviour and 
financial stability of euro area banks with different levels of market power before and after the 
ECB sets NIRP in 2014. On the one hand, we find evidence of the existence of the bank lending 
channel but also that increased market power during the NIRP period hinders monetary-policy 
transmission. On the other hand, we find that after setting negative rates, banks with higher 
market power reduce their overall risk. This latter result is confirmatory of the “competition-
fragility” view, which suggests that an erosion (increase) of market power and a decrease 
(increase) in mark-up would encourage banks to take excessive (less) risks.  
The many empirical works which study the NIRP effects cover different fields, i.e. the NIRP 
effects on bank profitability (Altavilla et al., 2018; Molyneux et al., 2019), on systemic risk 
(Nucera et al., 2017), on lending channel (Eggertsson et al., 2019, Heider et al., 2019), on 
investment choices (Bubeck et al., 2020), however, to our knowledge, this work is the first 
paper to analyse how NIRP affects banks’ market power. Furthermore, by analysing 
empirically in a novel way the influence of banks’ market power on monetary policy 
transmission in a negative interest rate environment, we contribute to the existing literature 
studying the influence of monetary policy on the bank-lending channel (Borio and Gambacorta, 
2017; Salachas et at., 2017) and the impact of competition on the bank lending channel 
(Fungácová et al.,2014; Leroy, 2014). We also contribute to the literature that analyses 
financial stability by focusing on competition (Allen and Gale, 2004; De Jonghe et al.,2016; 
Jiménez et al., 2013) and negative interest rates (Bubeck et al., 2020; Heider et al, 2019; IMF, 
2015). More specifically, we contribute to this literature by studying the link between financial 
stability and competition in a context of negative interest rates.  Our research differs from the 
existing studies in terms of methodology and sample coverage.  
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The article continues with the following structure. Section 2 reviews the existing academic 
literature relevant for this study. Section 3 depicts the evolution of competition in the Eurozone. 
Section 4 sheds light on the tripod estimation methodology applied in this study and Section 5 
describes the adopted empirical models, estimation strategy and data. Section 6 reports the 
empirical results and Section 7 reports a battery of robustness checks which confirm the 
baseline findings. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
2. Literature review. 
2.1. Banking competition  
The study of competitive conditions in the financial sector is of considerable interest to 
academics and policy makers owing to the presence of significant links between competition, 
credit behaviour and the soundness of the financial system.  
The academic literature on banking competition is divided in two main strands, namely 
structural and non-structural. The first strand draws inspiration by Bain (1956), which was the 
developer of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) model. The SCP approach employs 
concentration measures to determine the competitive conduct, thus the market structure would 
provide information relating to banks’ pricing power. The underlying idea is that in a more 
concentrated environment it is easier to collude, as a result banks can generate high returns. 
However, Berger et al (2004) point out that researchers found several weaknesses in the SCP 
approach. For example, Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) argue that a higher market share 
may not be due to a greater market power, but it could rather be a by-product of greater 
efficiency, leading to higher profits and consequently to a higher market share (Efficient 
Structure paradigm). Furthermore, Hannan (1991) and Berger and Hannan (1998) argue that 
banks in a highly concentrated market follow a "quiet life", accordingly they can charge higher 
prices but have no incentive to minimize costs, so higher market concentration could not 
generate higher profits (SCP paradigm). 
Due to the aforementioned weaknesses, a more recent strand of literature employs a non-
structural approach38 for studying the dynamic of banking competition. By analysing the 
pricing behaviour of banks, this approach seeks to directly detect bank conduct. Measures such 
as Lerner index (Lerner, 1934), the H-statistc (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) or the more recent 
Boone indicator (Boone, 2008), allow direct measurement of bank competition.  
 
38 It is also known as the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO). 
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Against this backdrop, our article intends to contribute to the non-structural approach literature 
assessing the impact of NIRP on banks’ market power. 
 
2.2. Banking competition and bank lending channel 
As banking competition may influence how monetary policy is transmitted to bank lending, it 
is essential to take into consideration bank market power for an exhaustive assessment of the 
pass-through mechanism of the NIRP. In this context, it is key to capture the possible way 
NIRP may affect banks’ market power. 
Recent researches provide evidence that bank market power is an important element that affects 
the pass-through of monetary policy through the banking system to the supply of loans (e.g., 
Drechsler et al., 2017; Scharfstein and Sunderam 2016). Fungácová et al. (2014), using a large 
panel of banks from 12 eurozone countries over the period 2002–2010, analyse the reaction of 
loan supply to monetary policy actions depending on the degree of bank competition. They 
find that greater bank competition fosters the transmission of monetary policy via the bank 
lending channel. Therefore, wide variations in the level of bank market power may lead to 
asymmetric effects of the single monetary policy. Leroy (2014) obtains similar results by 
analysing the entire euro area as he points out that market power reduces the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. However, Fungácová et al. (2014) and Leroy (2014) obtain different results 
as regards the role of competition in distressed periods. Fungácová et al. (2014) find no 
evidence on the role of bank competition in the transmission of monetary policy during the 
crisis.39 By contrast, Leroy (2014) suggests that during the GFC the negative effect of market 
power on monetary effectiveness has remained. Also, in light of the aforementioned dichotomy 
related to the crisis period, we deem necessary to investigate the transmission of monetary 
policy via the lending channel during the negative policy rate period. 
2.3. Banking competition and financial stability 
The literature provides many insights concerning the nature of the relationship between bank 
competition and financial stability, however, the evidence remains mixed. On the one hand, 
Allen and Gale (2004) support the “competition-fragility” view, which suggests that more 
competition would lead to an erosion of market power and decreased profit margins, and 
 
39 Altunbas et al. (2012) also find no impact of competition on bank behaviour in crisis times, i.e. competition 
does not seem to influence bank risk. 
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thereby would encourage banks to take excessive risks. On the other hand, Boyd and De Nicoló 
(2005) support the “competition-stability” view, which implies that more intense competition 
leads to lower interest rates for borrowers, thus reducing borrowers’ defaults and asset portfolio 
risk. This would suggest that banks become riskier as competition decreases. However, Berger 
et al. (2009) show that the two views could coexist because banks’ overall risks can be kept in 
check if banks protect their charter-value through risk-mitigating measures, while Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detriagiache (1998) sustain that increasing bank competition erodes charter-value 
and reduces this incentive towards prudence, therefore lower franchise values and lower market 
power are likely to lead to increased fragility. Using a widely used measure of bank soundness 
(Z-score) and market power (Lerner index), De Jonghe et al. (2016) provide evidence that bank 
market power and bank stability are positively correlated in the European banking sector over 
the period 2000–2014. In the light of this latest study, it is important to investigate whether the 
positive relationship between bank soundness and market power persists in a context of 
negative rates.  
3. Evolution of competition in the Eurozone 
There is a rich literature, which has analysed the evolution of competition in the European 
banking sector, providing a comprehensive picture of its dynamics before and after the GFC. 
Although, a number of studies argue that the deregulation process, coupled with the 
strengthening of European banking integration, should lead to a marked increase in 
competition, the empirical evidences have shown mixed results for the EU banking markets. 
Casu and Girardone (2009), analysing the effect of EU deregulation and competition policies 
on the competitive conditions of the main European banking markets over the period 2000-
2005, find important differences across countries, suggesting that significant barriers to the 
integration of the EU retail banking markets may exist. On the contrary, Weill (2013) finds 
some evidences of banking integration taking place across EU countries and the convergence 
of the levels of banking competition in the period 2002-2010. Specifically, Weill (2013), using 
the Lerner index, finds that the Lerner index increased before the financial crisis (2002-2006) 
while it decreased during the crisis (2006-2010) though still hovering above the 2002 average 
level. De Jonghe et al. (2016), consistently with Weill (2013), find a decrease in competition 
in the period 2000-14 for a broad sample of EU banks. However, they find that the financial 
crisis had a deep detrimental effect on competition, with market power increasing sharply 
between 2008 and 2014 reaching the highest value of the period in 2014. Fernández de Guevara 
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and Maudos (2017) further validate the previous results, since they find that overall 
competition has deteriorated over the period 2002-13. Also a recent ECB report (2017) 
suggests that banks’ market power has increased in comparison with the crisis and pre-crisis 
periods for the euro area as a whole and in most Member States.40 
However, all the most recent papers analysed the evolution of competition in the European 
banking sector in the pre-NIRP period. Thus, our paper intends to contribute to the literature 
that studies the evolution of competitive conditions in the banking sector in the euro area in 
light of the introduction of negative monetary policy rates.  Furthermore, intends to assess how 
this evolution affected the lending channel and financial stability in the NIRP period.  
 
 




In this study, we gauge banks’ market power, mainly using the Lerner index, which relies on 
individual bank-level data. The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) measures the bank mark-up, that 
is the difference between output prices and marginal costs, and it is defined as: 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = �𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�/𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡    [1] 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the price of total assets computed as the ratio of total (interest and non interest) 
income to total assets for bank i at time t and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the marginal cost of total assets for 
bank i at time t. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is computed relying on a standard translog function with a single output 
(total assets) and three input prices for deposits, labour and physical capital. To generate 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, we use the same methodology used by Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria (2010) and 
Anginer et al. (2014), in which the log cost function is calculated separately for each country: 
 
 
40 This report suggests that this evolution has been driven mainly by a fall in the marginal costs of providing 
banking services, due to efficiency gains and lower costs of bank funding. By contrast, prices have remained 
broadly unchanged resulting in a somewhat reduced banking competition. 
105 
 
log(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 × log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2 × (log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡))2 + 𝛽𝛽3 × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽5 × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽6 × log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽7 × log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽8 × log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽9 × �log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡��
2
+ 𝛽𝛽10 × �log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡��
2
+ 𝛽𝛽11 × �log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡��
2
+ 𝛽𝛽12 × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝛽𝛽13 × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽14 × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�
+ 𝜃𝜃 × 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝛾𝛾 × 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡          [2] 
 
where bank costs (𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) are a function of output (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 for the total asset), three input prices (i.e. 
the price of borrowed funds �𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�, the price of labour (𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), and the price of physical capital 
�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡�)41, and a vector of year and bank specialization dummies.  
We estimate Eq. [2] by using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and setting five restrictions 
aimed at ensuring homogeneity of degree one in input prices: 
 
𝛽𝛽3 + 𝛽𝛽4 + 𝛽𝛽5 = 1 ;  𝛽𝛽6 + 𝛽𝛽7 + 𝛽𝛽8 = 0 ;  𝛽𝛽9 + 𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽13 = 0 ;                               
𝛽𝛽10 + 𝛽𝛽12 + 𝛽𝛽14 = 0 ;  𝛽𝛽11 + 𝛽𝛽13 + 𝛽𝛽14 = 0                                              [3] 
  
Exploiting the estimated coefficients from Eq. [2] we compute the marginal cost 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡⁄ × [𝛽𝛽1 + 2 × 𝛽𝛽2 × log(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽6 × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� 
                           +𝛽𝛽7 × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽8 × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡��                                                     [4] 
 
The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, where a higher index means a greater market 
power and thus a lower competition. The antipodes of the Lerner index represent a perfectly 
competitive bank (index equals 0) and a monopolistic bank (index equals 1).  
 
Bank lending channel 
Banks’ behaviour is crucial to ensure an   effective transmission of monetary policy to the real 
economy. The literature on the bank lending channel investigates the effects of monetary policy 
on banks’ behaviour (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). In this study, we use the annual growth rate 
 
41 The price of borrowed funds �𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� is defined as total interest expenses over total assets, the price of labour 
(𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) is defined as staff expenses over total assets, and finally the price of physical capital �𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� is defined as 
overhead expenses net of personnel expenses over total assets. 
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of bank loans as dependent variable in the regression analysis that assesses the influence of the 
NIRP and more broadly of monetary policy on credit growth (Leroy, 2014; Borio and 
Gambacorta, 2017; Salachas et al., 2017). Specifically, ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the annual growth rate 
of loans in period t of bank i and it is calculated as the growth rate of bank loans between t and 
t-1. In the spirit of Gan (2007), who supports the idea that it is important to normalize the 
measure of lending, in our analysis, we also use a different specification of our dependent 
variable. More precisely, we use ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM which is the annual growth rate of loans in 
period t of bank i normalized by the average annual growth rate of the same bank during the 
four years prior to the NIRP. 
 
∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM = ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −  
1
4
∑ ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖   [5] 
 
where T=2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 is the time period (year). 
A higher level of ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 or ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM represents a more marked increase in bank 
lending, with non-trivial effects for the real economy. 
 
Bank stability 
We use the Z-score as a measure of bank soundness. This yardstick is widely used to assess the 
overall stability of banks at individual level (Boyd et al., 2006; Berger et al., 2009; Beck et al., 
2013; De Jonghe et al., 2016). The Z-score, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, indicates the distance from insolvency of bank 
i in country j at time t. More specifically, it indicates the number of standard deviations that 
bank profitability has to fall below the average for the bank to become insolvent. The Z-score 





      [6] 
 
where ROA is a measure of profitability, i.e. the return on assets for bank i at time t, EA is a 
measure of capitalisation, namely the ratio of equity-to-total assets, and σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of the ROA in country j at time t. The Z-score increases with a higher level of 
profitability and capitalization, while it decreases with greater volatility of bank returns. We 
use the logarithmic version of Z-Score to avoid problems owed to the skewness in the 
distribution of the variable (Avignone et al., 2021). A high Z-score represents a greater level 
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of bank stability. Therefore, a Z-score decrease (increase) indicates a decrease (increase) in the 
bank stability. 
In the spirit of Mercieca et al. (2007) and Turk-Ariss (2010), we also use another measure of 





        [7] 
 
where RORROA indicates the risk-adjusted ROA, that is ROA divided by its volatility. However, 
in this case the volatility of the ROA, σ(ROA), is measured as the standard deviation of ROA 
for bank i at time t. Coherently, a higher value of RORROA indicates more bank stability. 
 
5. Empirical model, estimation strategy and data 
5.1 Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy  
Market power  
We adopt a DiD approach to examine the impact of NIRP on market power, on bank lending 
and bank stability. Several studies use this approach to study the effects of NIRP (Eggertsson 
et al., 2017, Heider et al., 2019, Bubeck et al., 2020). This approach (see for example Molyneux 
et al. (2019) and Lopez et al. (2020)) allows us to use a panel data set up for comparing a treated 
group of banks (NIRP-affected) with a control group (NIRP-unaffected). 
Our baseline specification is the following: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽′𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + γj  + φ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡  [8] 
Where Yi,j,t represents the Lerner index for bank i in country j at time t. However, we also 
develop two further econometric specifications in which Yi,j,t represents the logarithm of the 
Lerner index’s components 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, i.e. respectively output prices and marginal costs. 
Treatedi,j is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by 
NIRP and 0 otherwise. Postj,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that 
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country j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period.42 β1 is our coefficient 
of interest, which represents the average difference in the Lerner index between banks that have 
been affected by NIRP and banks that have been not. Ki,j denotes our vector of control 
variables, namely bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables. More 
specifically, as bank specific variables we include total customer deposits-to-total assets 
(Funding Structure), gross loans-to-total assets (Asset Structure), liquid asset to total assets 
(Liquidity), equity-to-total assets (Leverage) and the logarithm of the bank total asset (Size). 
As macroeconomic control variables, we include: real GDP growth rate (GDP), CPI inflation 
rate (Inflation), the ratio central bank assets to GDP (Central bank assets), the Deposit Facility 
rate (Monetary Policy)43, and Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness (Financial 
openness). Finally, we also include banks fixed effects (γ) and time fixed effects (φ)44. We use 
robust standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence 
(Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007; Petersen, 2009). 
Using a DiD approach, our dependent variable, the Lerner index, must satisfy the parallel trend 
assumption, which is crucial to identify the causal effect of the treatment (Bertrand et al., 2004; 
Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Figure 3 shows the mean of the Lerner index for both the 
treated and control banks for the period between 2011 to 2014. In this pre-treatment period, 
correlation among the euro area and non-euro area group is 0.84, indicating that, before the 
treatment, changes over time in banking competition were nearly similar in the treatment and 
control group, providing evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds. 
Table 1 corroborates the finding of Figure 3. The first two rows of columns [1] – [2] of table 1 
show the average level of the Lerner index for the control and treatment groups in the pre- and 
post-NIRP period. The last row of columns [1] and [2] highlights that in the NIRP period both 
groups experienced a statistically significant increase in their market power, however, the 
increase in market power was larger for the treatment group. The bottom row of column [3] 
shows the unconditional difference in differences effect, which is positive and statistically 
significant. The magnitude and significance of the latter coefficient shows that banks that have 
 
42 The treated countries in our sample introduced the NIRP on 5 June 2014, so the dummy Post j,t takes the value 
1 from 2015 onward. For robustness, we re-estimate the model with the treatment timing redefined, to see how 
the estimation changes if the dummy Post j,t takes value 1 in 2014 instead of 2015.  
43 We also estimate a different specification (available upon request) with main refinancing operations (MRO) 
rate rates instead of DF rates to account for central bank monetary policies. The findings are consistent with the 
baseline results obtained in the paper. 
44 Moreover, in an additional specification (available upon request) we further tighten our econometric 
specification replacing year and country fixed effects by including country*time fixed effects to account for time 
varying country-level unobservable heterogeneity. The results obtained relying on this specification are consistent 
with the main results reported in the paper. 
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been affected by NIRP on average increased their market power more than banks located in 
countries which did not adopt the NIRP. In summary, table 1 finds preliminary evidences for 
our hypothesis that the NIRP led to an increase in euro area banks’ market power. 
Columns [4] and [5] of table 1 further document that the Lerner index has been on average 
increasing both in the pre- and in the post- NIRP periods for both the treatment and control 
group. Moreover, column [6] of table 1 shows that the difference between the treatment and 
control group in the growth of the Lerner index in the pre-NIRP period is not significantly 
different from zero. We take this as further evidence that the parallel trend assumption holds. 
As mentioned above, it also shows that the growth in market power significantly steepened its 
slope for NIRP affected banks after the introduction of the negative interest rate policy.  
 
Bank lending channel 
The changes in euro area banks’ market power over time suggest the need of a detailed analysis 
of the effects of this evolution on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In this context, 
we adopt a different identification strategy, which exploits only euro area banks and compares 
the lending behaviour of high-market power and low-market power banks in the pre- and post-
NIRP periods.45 Relying on the following specification we study the impact of bank 
competition on the transmission of monetary policy via the lending channel: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽3�𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + γj  + φ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡   [9] 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 denotes our measues of lending, specifically, it is ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 or ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM of 
bank i in country j at time t. MP is the Deposit Facility rate in country j at time t. The 
specification of eq. [9] is in line with the one used by Heider et al. (2019) and Bubeck et al. 
(2020), in which the variable of interest is the triple interaction. Our coefficient of interest is 
thus 𝛽𝛽1, as it allows to test whether the impact of the policy rate in the NIRP period was 
significantly different for banks with a greater market power. A statistically significant positive 
coefficient would provide evidence of the impact of bank competition on the bank lending 
channel and show that banks with a higher level of market power are less sensitive to changes 
 
45 We carry out a correlation analysis and a visual inspection as well as we perform the T-test for differences in 
means of the slope of high-market power and low-market power banks in the pre-NIRP period. All these tests 
(available on request) validate the parallel test assumption. Therefore, the lending behaviour of high-market and 
low-market power banks followed a similar trend in the pre-NIRP period. 
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in the monetary policy rate during the NIRP period. 𝛽𝛽5 tests the presence of the bank lending 
channel and 𝛽𝛽2 allows to examine the role of bank competition in affecting the bank lending 
channel. 
Bank stability 
It is also important to shed light on the potential effects of the increase in market power during 
the NIRP period on financial stability. Accordingly, using the sample of euro area banks, we 
estimate a further specification46 with the aim of investigating the link between bank market 
power and bank stability: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1�𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽′𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 + γj  + φ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 [10] 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 denotes banks’ soundness measured by the Z-score and RORROA of bank i in country j at 
time t. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 denotes our vector of bank specific characteristics. β1 is our coefficient of interest, 
which represents the average impact of banks’ market power on banks’ soundness for NIRP-
affected banks. 
5.2 Data  
In this analysis, we rely on yearly data for the period between 2011 and 2018 extracted from 
several sources. Bank balance sheet information is sourced from Moody’s BankFocus (Bureau 
Van Dijk) and SNL Financial (S&P Global Market Intelligence), whilst macroeconomic 
variables are retrieved from World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Statistical Data 
Warehouse (European Central Bank). The dataset consists of 19 euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain) and 9 non-euro area 
countries (Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, Romania, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America)47. Given that BankFocus and SNL 
comprise financial statement data that can either be consolidated or unconsolidated, we include 
in our dataset the data that are either unconsolidated or consolidated but without an 
 
46 As in the previous section, we also here perform the T-test for differences in means of the slope of high-market 
power and low-market power banks in the pre-NIRP period, as well as carry out correlation and a visual 
inspection. All these tests (available on request) validate the parallel test assumption. Therefore, the bank stability 
of high-market and low-market power banks followed a similar trend in the pre-NIRP period. 
47 Investigating the effect of NIRP on bank margins and profitability in Europe, Molyneux et al. (2019) use a 




unconsolidated subsidiary, in order to avoid the inclusion of duplicate observations. The final 
sample consists of 2,876 banks in the euro area (treatment group) and 1,347extra-euro area 
banks (control group). All bank specific characteristics are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level 
to smooth the influence of outliers. The cross-correlation matrix, which shows that our control 
variables are not highly correlated48 can be found in Table A.1. Table A.2 provides a detailed 
description of the used variables and their sources. Descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 
A.3, where we can observe that euro area banks increased their market power by 20 percent 
after the introduction of NIRP, as the Lerner index reached 0.24 from 0.20, while in the 
meantime no-NIRP affected banks increased their Lerner index by about 8 percent, from 0.24 
to 0.26. Furthermore Figure A.1, which depicts the Lerner index distributions for the treatment 
and control groups in the pre-NIRP and NIRP periods, confirms the descriptive evidence 
exhibited in Table A1 and shows a more marked increase in market power after the introduction 
of the NIRP for euro area banks than for banks which were not subject to this policy. This result 
suggests that the euro area banking sectors featured a more significant decline in competition 
than the non-euro area banking sectors considered in this analysis. 
Furthermore Figure 1 shows the evolution of bank market power for the treatment and control 
group, as measured by the indexed version of the average Lerner index, over the sample period. 
Figure 1 shows that banks’ market power has been generally increasing for both groups during 
the sample period. However, after the introduction of the NIRP in 2014 the evolution of banks’ 
market power trendof the treatment and the control group has significantly decoupled as market 
power increased at a faster pace for banks established in countries which adopted the NIRP. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the determinants of the Lerner Index over the sample period 
for both the treatment and the control groups. As regards the costs, it can be observed that the 
price of borrowed funds (Chart A), the price of labour (Chart B) and the price of physical 
capital (Chart C) are generally declining for both groups of banks. Relevant exception is the 
price of borrowed funds for the control group which after 2014 is increasing. As regards the 
revenues, Figure 2 shows a decrease in banks’ net interest income (Chart D) in NIRP countries 
which is to some extent compensated by an increase in euro area banks’ net fees and 
commissions (Chart E). Overall, in the aftermath of 2014 euro area banks showed less 
pronounced reduction in revenues than in costs relative to non-euro area banks. These 
 
48 We also develop the Hausman test for endogeneity, which tells us that there is not reverse causality among 
dependent and control variables (results not reported but available upon request). 
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dynamics are consistent with the higher level of market power of euro area banks in the 
aftermath of the NIRP. 
 
Bank balance sheet variables. In our regression analyses we include the variable total 
customer deposits-to-total assets to control for banks’ funding structure. The NIRP highlighted 
that banks are reluctant to pass negative rates on to depositors. Accordingly, banks with a 
greater dependence on deposit funding have exhibited higher funding costs and experienced a 
larger reduction in their net interest margins (Heider et al, 2019). Hence, we expect to observe 
a negative relationship between our variable for the funding structure and the Lerner index 
since lower margins are associated with a lower market power. Furthermore, we include in our 
regressions among the bank specific controls, the ratio of gross loans-to-total assets to capture 
banks’ asset structure which is a proxy for banks’ business model and specialization. Banks 
with a higher share of loans over total assets  carry out more traditional lending activities and 
are more concentrated in the retail market and, thus, should exhibit a higher market power as 
this market features a lower degree of integration and competition than wholesale and trading 
markets amid greater barriers to entry (Fernández de Guevara et al, 2005).  
We employ the variable liquid asset to total assets to control for bank liquidity. Liquidity 
generates lower margins, as higher liquidity results into lower returns. Fernández de Guevara 
and Maudos (2007) provide empirical evidences that the banks that maintain a higher level of 
liquidity have a lower market power. Moreover, in our regressions, we use the variable equity-
to-total assets to account for bank leverage. A higher level of bank leverage leads to lower 
funding costs (Arnould et al., 2021) and better performance (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999). Accordingly, Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2014) find a positive relationship between the 
ratio equity-to-total assets and the Lerner index, highlighting that higher leverage could be 
positively associated with market power. We include the logarithm of banks’ total assets to 
measure bank size. Size may have an impact on market power for two reasons: (i) it leads to 
cost benefits (economies of scale) and better managerial skills and (ii) it confers market power 
by itself. To capture a possible nonlinear relationship between size and market power, we also 
insert in Eq. [8] the quadratic term of the size variable. Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005) find 
a positive relationship between the Lerner index and size, however, using the quadratic term 





Macroeconomic variables. In our regressions, we employ the real GDP growth rate as a proxy 
of economic activity as the Lerner index could be impacted by business cycle dynamics. 
Athanasouglu et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between the business cycle and banking 
performance, as an economic boom should lead to larger margins associated with increased 
demand for credit and stock market transactions. We also control for inflation by including the 
CPI inflation rate as for example Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) assert that banks could 
claim higher risk premium on their loans in an inflationary environment.  
We exploit the Deposit Facility rate to account for conventional monetary policy49. Scharfstein 
and Sunderam (2016) suggest the existence of a negative relationship between the main policy 
rate and bank market power. An increase in monetary policy rates makes bank loans less 
attractive to firms. Therefore, total lending shrinks and banks optimally lower their mark-ups 
on loans to mitigate the effect of lower credit demand. We also employ central bank assets to 
GDP to capture the possible effects of unconventional monetary policy. Alessandri and Nelson 
(2015) provide evidence that unconventional monetary policy depresses income margins, 
moreover, Lambert and Ueda (2014) find that the size of the central bank balance sheet is 
negatively related to banks’ interest and non-interest income. Accordingly, unconventional 
monetary policies should decrease bank mark-ups.  Finally, we use the Chinn-Ito index to 
measure financial openness. Favouring foreign capital flows and easing barriers to entry 
stimulate domestic bank competition (Luo et al., 2016). Furthermore, financial openness leads 
to improving the quality and availability of financial services fostering a higher level of 
banking competition (Calderón and Kubota, 2009). Therefore, we expect to observe a positive 
relationship between the Chinn-Ito index and competition in the banking sector. 
 
6. Empirical results 
In this section, we report the results of our regression analysis that i) evaluates the impact of 
NIRP and bank specific characteristics on euro area banks’ market power, ii) assesses the 
impact of competition on monetary policy transmission during the NIRP period and finally iii) 
estimate the relationship between banks' market power and banks’ financial stability during the 
NIRP period.  
 
49 Prior to the GFC, the main policy rate was the MRO. In the wake of the crisis, however, demand for Central 
Bank loans has been limited, on the contrary banks have increased their deposits with Central Banks. As a result, 
since 2009 the interest rate on the Bank’s deposits has had greater influence on money market rates, effectively 





By employing the Lerner index as dependent variable, Table 2 shows the empirical results 
obtained from the estimation of Eq. [8] which allows to assess the effect of NIRP on banks’ 
market power. The table is structured in 5 columns. Column 1 contains the results for the 
regression including only the interaction between the post dummy and the treated dummy, 
while column 2 reports the results for the regression including the interaction, bank and time 
fixed effects. In columns 3 and 4, we add bank-specific variables while keeping both fixed 
effects. Column 5 shows the results of the regression which includes bank specific variables, 
macroeconomic variables, bank and time fixed effects. To answer our question, we are 
particularly interested in the magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficient (β1) of the interaction term which represents the average difference between the 
Lerner index of banks located in countries whose policy rate has ventured into negative 
territory and those located in countries which have not adopted NIRP. This effect is indicated 
in Table 2 as “NIRP-effect”. 
Our results, as expected, show that the coefficient of NIRP-effect is positive and statistically 
significant in every specification, suggesting that euro area banks increased their mark-up after 
the implementation of the NIRP in comparison to banks located in countries which did not 
adopt the NIRP. More specifically, according to our baseline regression in column 5, the 
adoption of the NIRP led to an increase in the Lerner index by 1.6 bps.   
Our results are robust to different specifications, the NIRP-effect is positive and statistically 
significant in all estimated models reported in Table 2. In columns 3, 4 and 5, we can observe 
that several bank specific characteristics are statistically significant. We find a positive 
relationship between banks’ asset structure and Lerner index, in particular, an increase in the 
share of customer loans by 10 percentage points leads on average to an increase in the Lerner 
index of about 0.5 bps. This result means that banks with a larger exposure to the retail market 
have a higher market power. Differently, liquidity is negatively correlated to market power. In 
fact, a 10 percentage points increase in liquidity decreases the Lerner index by about 0.6 bps. 
This confirms our expectations, as higher liquidity results into lower remuneration which 
translates into lower market power. Leverage have the greatest impact on market power. 
Specifically, we find that an increase in banks’ leverage of 10 percentage points induces an 
increase in the Lerner index by about 1.3 bps on average. There is also a positive link between 
size and market power, a 100 bps increase in size generates a increase in the Lerner index of 
around 2.7 percentage, indicating that bank size is an important source of market power. 
Column 4 reports the results by adding the size-squared variable. The coefficient of the latter 
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is negative and statistically significant, which means that the positive relationship between 
market power and bank size is not linear, therefore, the advantages due to banks’ size decrease 
as bank total assets increase. Finally, column 5 reports the result by including macroeconomic 
control variables. The NIRP-effect is still positive and significant, while the bank-specific 
variables confirm previous results. Inflation is positively related to the Lerner index, i.e. an 
increase in inflation of 1 percentage point leads to an increase in the Lerner index of about 0.5 
bps. The size of the central bank's balance sheet is negative related to banks’ market power. An 
increase in the size of the central bank's balance sheet by 10 percentage points causes the Lerner 
index to decrease by about 2 bps. Therefore, central banks’ asset purchases are a threat to banks' 
mark-up. The estimate coefficient of the monetary policy rate is negative and significant 
confirming our hypothesis. A monetary policy tightening of 100 bps decreases the Lerner index 
by 1.9 bps. An increase in the policy rates makes bank loans less attractive to firms. Therefore, 
total lending shrinks and banks optimally lower the mark-ups they apply on loans to mitigate 
the effect of lower loan demand (Scharfstein and Sunderam, 2016). Finally, the negative 
coefficient of the Chinn-Ito index suggests that financial barriers favour the market power of 
banks. 
Table 3 shows the empirical findings obtained from the estimation of Eq. [8] in which the 
dependent variables are the logarithm of the output prices (columns [1], [3] and [5]) and the 
logarithm of the marginal costs (columns [2], [4] and [6]). The results show that output prices 
and marginal costs of euro area banks decreased after the introduction of the NIRP in 
comparison to no-NIRP affected banks. However, Table 3 depicts that this percentage 
reduction is deeper for marginal costs than output prices. In particular this difference is more 
marked when we control for bank and country specific characteristics. In summary, the latter 
finding suggests that the recent increase in market power is driven by a more marked reduction 
in costs than in returns for euro area banks. 
 
Monetary policy transmission mechanism   
Table 4 reports the results obtained from the estimation of Eq. [9] which allows to assess the 
impact of bank competition on the transmission of monetary policy via the lending channel. 
Our results show that the estimated coefficient of the monetary policy rate (𝛽𝛽5) is negative and 
statistically significant providing empirical evidence of the existence of a bank lending channel 
in the euro area and proving that a decrease (increase) in the monetary policy rate leads to an 
increase (decrease) in loan growth rate. Furthermore, we find that our coefficient of interest, 
𝛽𝛽1, which is the coefficient of the triple interaction between the Lerner index, the monetary 
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policy rate and the dummy variable NIRP, is positive and significant. The significance of the 
estimated coefficient of the interaction term shows that the impact of a monetary policy easing 
(tightening) on loan growth in the NIRP period was significantly different for banks with a 
different level of market power. The positive sign of the coefficient, which is the opposite of 
the sign of the estimated coefficient of the monetary policy rate, indicates that a higher market 
power during the NIRP period hindered the transmission of monetary policy. The coefficient 
of the interaction term between the deposit facility rate and the Lerner index, 𝛽𝛽2, which allows 
us to examine the role of bank competition in affecting the bank lending channel the overall 
sample period, is not statistically significant. This result is in line with Fungácová et al. (2014), 
who find that bank competition does not significantly affect the transmission of monetary 
policy after the GFC. Borio and Gambacorta (2017) also find no evidence of the existence of 
the bank lending channel in a low interest rate environment by considering the period 2009-14. 
In summary, our result for 𝛽𝛽2 is consistent with the existing literature on the role of banks’ 
market power in affecting monetary transmission via the lending channel in the pre-NIRP 
period. However, our result for 𝛽𝛽1 provides new insights on the role on competition in affecting 
monetary policy transmission via the lending channel during the NIRP period.  
The aforementioned results hold for two different specifications of the dependent variable, i.e. 
both when we use loan growth rate and loan growth rate normalised. 
 
Financial stability 
Table 5 reports the results obtained from the estimation of Eq. [10] which allows to assess the 
effects of competition on bank stability.  
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the Lerner index and the dummy 
variable NIRP, β1, is positive and significant. This indicates that banks with a higher level of 
Lerner index have reduced their overall risks after 2014 as a higher Z-score implies that a bank 
is more distant from default. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term shows that in the 
aftermath of the introduction of a NIRP an increase in the in the Lerner index of 10 bps led to 
1.5 percentage increase in the Z-score. This result is validated by the similar results reported in 
column (2) where the dependent variable of the regression is the RORROA. 
Our results are in line with the “competition-fragility” view (Allen and Gale, 2004), which 
suggests that a higher level of market power discourage banks to take excessive risks. Similarly 
to De Jonghe et al. (2016), who find a positive relationship between bank market power and 
bank stability over the period 2000–2014, we provide empirical evidence that European banks 
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with a higher level of market power decreased their overall risk in the aftermath of the 
introduction of the NIRP, thus promoting the financial stability of the euro area. 
 
7. Robustness checks  
In this section we provide evidence that our results stand up a battery of robustness checks.  
 
7.1 Quantile regression 
Studies using standard panel data techniques may fail to capture the potential non-linear effects 
of bank-specific characteristics. Therefore, we estimate a quantile panel model to examine the 
non-linear effects of bank specific variables on market power. We follow the approach 
proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019), whose set up also allows quantile-variant fixed 
effects: 
𝑄𝑄𝑌𝑌�𝜏𝜏�𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�  = (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞(𝜏𝜏) ) + 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� +  𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡′ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡′  γ 𝑞𝑞(𝜏𝜏)   [11] 
The variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 is the Lerner index, while 𝜏𝜏 is the 𝜏𝜏-th quantile of 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 and (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 𝑞𝑞(𝜏𝜏) ) 
are the quantile- 𝜏𝜏 fixed effect for bank i. 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 denotes our vector of bank and country 
characteristics. 𝛽𝛽1�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� is the interaction term between the NIRP dummy, 
which takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, and 
the Post dummy which takes the value 1 after the period that country j at time t decided to 
implement NIRP and 0 before that period. 
Table 6 reports the results of the quantile regression aimed at capturing the potential non-linear 
effects of bank-specific and country characteristics on market power. It shows the empirical 
results obtained from Eq. [11] and is structured in 5 columns. The columns contain the estimate 
results for the median, 10th, 30th, 70th and 90th percentiles, respectively. Our results show that 
the coefficient of NIRP effect is positive and statistically significant in each specification, 
suggesting that the increase in the Lerner index of European banks after the implementation of 
the NIRP is not a phenomenon linked to a specific level of market power. However, in term of 
significance levels the extreme deciles, namely 10th and 90th, are relatively less significant50. 
Also the impact of NIRP decreases to some extent as the level of the Lerner index increases 
indicating indeed some negligible non-linearity in the relation between the Lerner index and 
the NIRP. By analysing the bank-specific variables, funding structure is only statistically 
 
50 Albeit they are statistically significant at 10% level. 
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significant at 5% level on the median; while Asset structure has only a significant impact on 
the 70th percentile and the median. Liquidity is less significant in the lowest decile while it is 
insignificant in the highest decile. Size is the only bank specific variable statistically significant 
for each percentile. By observing the macroeconomic variables, a difference in terms of 
significance level is found only for some variables in the lower deciles and for Chinn-Ito index. 
Although the impact of some variables is not statistically significant in the lower deciles and 
the interaction term shows differences in terms of magnitude, the results of quantile regressions 
confirm the previous results and exclude too marked non-linear effects. 
In summary, NIRP has increased the market power of European banks regardless of their 
original level of market power. 
 
7.2 Redefine dummy post  
Highlighting that treated countries in our sample introduced NIRP on 5 June 2014 and that we 
assume the dummy Post j,t to take the value 1 from 2015 onward, in Table 7 we re-estimate the 
model with the treatment timing redefined to see how the estimation changes if the dummy 
Post j,t takes value 1 in 2014 instead of 2015. This further test is needed to investigate whether 
the empirical results are influenced by the authors' assumption on the timing of the treatment. 
Panel A (column 1) shows that the interaction dummy (NIRP-effect) is still positive and 
statistically significant, which is confirmatory of the previous results and rejects the possibility 
that results are driven by the authors' decision. 
7.3 Placebo test  
In Table 7 we also want to test if the results of our DiD estimation might be driven by other 
events occurred before our sample period. Specifically, we investigate whether similar results 
can be observed in 2012, year in which the Deposit Facility rate reached 0.00%. To rule out 
this hypothesis we create a fictitious post dummy starting in 2012. The interaction term is not 
statistically significant, therefore Panel B (Column 2) rejects this hypothesis and confirms that 
the market power increments in the euro area are due to the NIRP introduction. 
7.4 Window period  
Furthermore, we want to rule out the hypothesis that the results of our DiD estimation might 
be driven by the selected sample period or that it is purely a long-term phenomenon. Table 7 
reports the result of our DiD baseline estimation calculated in a narrower time period. Keeping 
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the sample symmetry, we shrink the time period of four years, therefore the new sample period 
goes from 2013 to 2016. The interaction variable is still significant, then Panel C (Column 3) 
rejects the time period bias and the long-term phenomenon hypothesis. This test is confirmatory 
of the NIRP effect, which also holds in the short-term period. 
7.5 H-statistic  
We test the robustness of our results employing a different definition of the dependent variable, 
by using the H-statistic ratio as an alternative market power measure in the baseline equation 
[8]. The H-statistic is a widely used measure of competition; it is based on the Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) methodology. It belongs to that strain of literature attributable to the non-structural 
approach. It is a direct measure of bank competition, which captures the elasticity of bank 
interest revenues to input prices. The economic insight is that in a perfect competitive 
environment, an increase in input prices will be followed by an increase in both marginal costs 
and total revenues by the same extent, therefore the H-statistic will be equal to 1. Differently, 
in a monopolistic context, an increase in input prices will be followed by an increase in 
marginal costs, then the decision to decrease the output followed by a decline in total revenues, 
therefore the H-statistic will be equal to or less than 0. In the middle, monopolistic competition 
varies between 0 and 1. In summary, the H-statistic ranges between ∞ (monopoly) and 1 
(perfect competition). 
By following the same approach used in Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Anginer et al.(2014), 
we calculate the reduced-form revenue regression for each country in each calendar year: 
 
log(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 × log�𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽2 × log�𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖� + 𝛽𝛽3 × log�𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾1 × log�𝑌𝑌1,𝑖𝑖�
+ 𝛾𝛾2 × log�𝑌𝑌2,𝑖𝑖� + 𝛾𝛾3 × log�𝑌𝑌3,𝑖𝑖� + Ω × 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                     [12] 
where the output price of loans (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) is a function of three input prices (𝑊𝑊1,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 for the price of 
borrowed funds, 𝑊𝑊2,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 for the price of labour, and 𝑊𝑊3,𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 for the price of physical capital), three 
control variables (𝑌𝑌1,𝑖𝑖 for the banks’ total assets, 𝑌𝑌2,𝑖𝑖 for the ratio of net loans to total assets, 
and 𝑌𝑌3,𝑖𝑖 for the ratio of equity to total assets) and a vector of bank specialization dummies. We 
estimate Eq. [12] by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). The H-statistic is the sum of the 
elasticities of revenue with respect to the three input prices, it is thus defined as: 
 




We use the opposite sign of the H-statistic51 aimed at improving the readability of the results, 
therefore, similarly to the Lerner index, a higher value denotes a greater bank mark-up. 
Table 7 outlines the result of the new regression, which uses the negative H-statistic as 
dependent variable in eq [8]. Panel D (column 4) shows that the interaction dummy “NIRP-
effect” is positive and statistically significant, which means that euro-area banks increased their 
market power when official rates went into negative territory. This result is confirmatory of 
our previous results, confirming the validity of the baseline model. 
 
7.6 Propensity Score Matching 
However, one concern with our baseline estimates could be that the results are not driven by 
the effect of the treatment itself but by systematic differences between banks in the control and 
treated groups. We address this concern by obtaining propensity score matching (PSM) 
estimates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which addresses the sample selection bias and takes 
into consideration time constant unobserved effects. We select a subsample of control (non-
treated) banks that are as close as possible a match for the sample of treated countries based on 
a set of observable characteristics. Specifically, among various algorithms that can be used to 
match treated and non-treated observations, we implement nearest neighbour(s), 5-nearest 
neighbours and kernel matching (Heckman et al., 1998).  
Outcomes are confirmatory of the previous results, as table 8 shows that the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT) is positive and statistically significant for Lerner index. Therefore, 
increases in the banks’ market power in the Eurozone are directly attributable to NIRP. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In the last decade, central banks launched an unprecedented accommodative monetary policy 
cycle. Moreover, several central banks located in advanced countries led their policy rates into 
negative territory. The effects of this new policy aroused interest in central banking circles and 
academia. In this study, we contribute to the ongoing literature on this topic addressing the 
impact that NIRP has on banking competition in the euro area. 
When entering into a negative interest rate territory, it can be argued that the behaviour of 
banks and their customers will change in comparison to a positive interest rate environment. 
 
51 Noteworthy is the fact that the reliability of the H-statistic depends on the long-run equilibrium, that is, return 
on bank assets must be not related to input prices. We test the E-statistic, which shows that the long-run 
equilibrium condition is satisfied (results not reported but available upon request). 
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We support the idea that behavioural changes affect the market power of banks, which in turn 
has monetary policy and financial stability implications.   
By analysing a sample of 4,223 banks over the period 2011–2018 and adopting a difference-in-
differences methodology, we provide empirical evidences that NIRP increased market power 
of the affected banks. Furthermore, we find that, in a negative rates context, bank competition 
has implications for monetary policy transmission and financial stability. In the euro area, 
during the NIRP period, the increased market power hindered the transmission of monetary 
policy and at the same time the higher level of market power discourages banks from taking 
excessive risks. 
In light of our findings, we argue that although negative rates have become a standard 
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Figure 1. Lerner index evolution pre and post-NIRP period.  
 
Figure 1 shows the yearly evolution of Lerner index (year 2014 = 100) for the treated banks 
(red dashed line) and non-treated banks (blue line). We calculate an index for each bank and 
plot the mean index for NIRP and no-NIRP affected banks. The vertical red line indicates the 
introduction of NIRP (year 0 = 2014).  
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Figure 2. Lerner index determinants pre- (2011-2014) and post- NIRP period (2015-2018) 
 
Figure 2 shows the average variable value for the treated banks (red dashed line) and non-
treated banks (blue line) from 2011 to 2018. Variables represent bank revenues and costs, 
specifically three banking input prices, i.e. the price of borrowed funds (A), the price of labour 
(B), and the price of physical capital (C), and interest (D) and non-interest income (E).   
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Figure 3. Parallel trend assumption pre-NIRP period (2011-2014) 
 
Figure 3 shows the yearly mean of Lerner index for the treated banks (red dashed line) and 
non-treated banks (blue line) from 2011 to 2014. In the pre-treatment period, correlation among 






Table 1. T-test for differences in means 
                    
Variable: Lerner index Level   First Difference 
  [1] [2]   [3]   [4] [5]   [6] 
  Control Treatment   Diff (T-C)   Control Treatment   Diff (T-C) 
Pre-NIRP 0.235 0.204   -0.030***   0.005 0.005   0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 
                    
Post-NIRP 0.255 0.24   -0.014***       0.006 0.009   0.003*** 
  (0.002) (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.001) 
                    
Diff (Post-Pre) 0.020*** 0.036***   0.016***   0.001 0.004***   0.003* 
  (0.003) (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.001) (0.001)   (0.002) 
Notes: The first two rows of columns [1], [2], [4] and [5] show the means of the Lerner index for the control group and treatment group 
before and after the NIRP, specifically [1] and [2] for the levels whereas [4] and [5] for the first differences. The bottom row of columns 
[1], [2], [4] and [5] shows the difference in means between the pre and post NIRP period and stars indicate the t-test for differences in 
means. Columns [3] and [6] show the difference in means between the two groups within the pre or post NIRP period and stars the t-
test for differences in means and differences in differences. The bottom row in columns [3] and [6] show the difference in differences 





Table 2. The effect of NIRP on Lerner index 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Baseline +Fixed Effects +Bank specific variables 
+Macroeconomic 
variables 
Variables  Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index 
            
NIRP-effect 0.0344*** 0.0140*** 0.0180*** 0.0153*** 0.0159*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0033) 
Funding Structure     -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005*** 
      (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Asset structure     0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 
      (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Liquidity     -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** 
      (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Leverage     0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0011** 
      (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Size     0.0266*** 0.0780*** 0.0374*** 
      (0.0055) (0.0229) (0.0057) 
Size-squared       -0.0034**   
        (0.0016)   
GDP         0.0012 
          (0.0008) 
Inflation         0.0054*** 
          (0.0016) 
Central bank assets         -0.0023*** 
          (0.0003) 
MP(Deposit Facility)         -0.0188*** 
          (0.0033) 
Chinn-Ito index         -0.0677** 
          (0.0291) 
            
Observations 29,789 29,789 27,160 27,160 23,220 
R-squared 0.00452 0.1023 0.1016 0.1035 0.1051 
Number of Banks 4,101 4,101 4,011 4,011 3,933 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Cluster(id) YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect 
competition). NIRP-effect is the interaction dummy Treatedij * Postjt; where Treatedij is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, while Postjt is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 after the period that country j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period. 
Funding Structure is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to total 
assets. Liquidity is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the ratio equity to total assets. Size is the logarithm 
of the bank total asset. GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Inflation is the Consumer Price Index. 
Central bank assets is the ratio central bank assets to GDP. MP is the Deposit Facility rate. Chinn-Ito is an index that 
measures the financial openness. Standard errors adjusted for both within correlation clustered at the bank level and 






Table 3. The effect of NIRP on output prices and marginal costs 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  Baseline+FE +Bank specific variables +Macroeconomic variables 
Variables  ln(P) ln(Mc) ln(P) ln(Mc) ln(P) ln(Mc) 
              
NIRP-effect -0.1455*** -0.1564*** -0.1652*** -0.2049*** -0.0831*** -0.1135*** 
  (0.0051) (0.0061) (0.0068) (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0102) 
Funding Structure     0.0010** 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0020*** 
      (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Asset structure     0.0018** 0.0005 0.0015** 0.0001 
      (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0003) 
Liquidity     -0.0030*** -0.0018*** -0.0025*** -0.0012** 
      (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Leverage     0.0081*** 0.0076*** 0.0079*** 0.0073*** 
      (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0023) 
Size     -0.1028*** -0.1739*** -0.1199*** -0.2035*** 
      (0.0153) (0.0221) (0.0161) (0.0231) 
GDP         -0.0113*** -0.0137*** 
          (0.0017) (0.0026) 
Inflation         -0.0026 -0.0088* 
          (0.0031) (0.0045) 
Central bank assets         -0.0035*** 0.0007 
          (0.0007) (0.0009) 
MP(Deposit Facility)         0.1142*** 0.1509*** 
          (0.0097) (0.0096) 
Chinn-Ito index         -0.0523*** -0.0183 
          (0.0197) (0.0240) 
              
Observations 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220 
R-squared 0.5229 0.4959 0.5810 0.5402 0.6178 0.5730 
Number of Banks 3,933 3,933 3,933 3,933 3,933 3,933 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cluster(id) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Ln(P) is the logarithm of the banks’ output prices while Ln(MC) is the logarithm of the banks’ marginal costs. NIRP-
effect is the interaction dummy Treated*Post, Treated ij is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has 
been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, while Post jt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country 
j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period. Funding Structure is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total 
assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the 
ratio equity to total assets. Size is the logarithm of the bank total asset. GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. 
Inflation is the Consumer Price Index. Central bank assets is the ratio central bank assets to GDP. MP is the Deposit Facility 
rate. Chinn-Ito is an index that measures the financial openness. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 





Table 4. The impact of bank competition on the transmission of monetary policy 
  (1) (2) 
Variables  ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
 
∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM    
 
      
Lerner index*MP*NIRP 0.4353*** 0.4742*** 
  (0.1682) (0.1635) 
Lerner index*MP 0.0776 0.0779 
  (0.0939) (0.0939) 
Lerner index*NIRP 0.1633*** 0.1753*** 
  (0.0604) (0.0592) 
NIRP*MP -0.9838*** -1.0515*** 
  (0.1814) (0.1775) 
NIRP  -0.3808*** -0.4061*** 
  (0.0677) (0.0663) 
Lerner index 0.0344 0.0322 
  (0.0298) (0.0297) 
MP(Deposit Facility) -0.0825** -0.0829** 
  (0.0387) (0.0387) 
      
Observations 18,694 18,406 
R-squared 0.0125 0.0135 
Number of Banks 2,778 2,697 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster(id) YES YES 
Note: ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the annual growth rate of loans in period t of bank i. ∆(𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 NORM  is the annual 
growth rate of loans in period t of bank i normalized by the average annual growth rate of the same bank 
during the four years prior to the NIRP. Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges 
between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect competition). NIRP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after 
the period that country j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period. MP is the Deposit 
Facility rate. Standard errors adjusted for both within correlation clustered at the bank level and 







Table 5. The impact of bank competition on financial stability 
  (1) (2) 
Variables Z-score RORROA 
      
Lerner index*NIRP 0.1467*** 0.0735** 
  (0.0241) (0.0292) 
Funding Structure 0.0001 0.0011 
  (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Asset structure 0.0000 -0.0011** 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Liquidity -0.0003 -0.0004 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Leverage 0.0566*** 0.0170*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0031) 
Size -0.0888*** 0.0146 
  (0.0217) (0.0208) 
      
Observations 17,755 17,745 
R-squared 0.5853 0.0495 
Number of Banks 2,744 2,744 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
Cluster(id) YES YES 
Note: Z-score indicates the distance from insolvency of bank i in country j at time t. 
RORROA indicates the risk-adjusted ROA, that is ROA divided by its volatility.  
Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges between 1 
(monopoly) and 0 (perfect competition). NIRP is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 after the period that country j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 
before that period. Funding Structure is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total 
assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio 
liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the ratio equity to total assets. Size is the 
logarithm of the bank total asset. Standard errors adjusted for both within correlation 
clustered at the bank level and heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. Significance 






Table 6. The effect of NIRP on Lerner index using quantile regression method 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Median 10th 30th 70th 90th 
Variables  Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index Lerner index 
            
NIRP-effect 0.0157*** 0.0197* 0.0176** 0.0140*** 0.0123* 
  (0.0050) (0.0118) (0.0077) (0.0050) (0.0073) 
Funding Structure -0.0005* -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Asset structure 0.0006** 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006** 0.0005 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Liquidity -0.0008*** -0.0009 -0.0009** -0.0008*** -0.0008* 
  (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Leverage 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 
  (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Size 0.0371*** 0.0439** 0.0403*** 0.0343*** 0.0314*** 
  (0.0077) (0.0180) (0.0117) (0.0076) (0.0112) 
GDP 0.0013 0.0004 0.0008 0.0016 0.0020 
  (0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0022) 
Inflation 0.0056* 0.0027 0.0042 0.0068** 0.0080* 
  (0.0031) (0.0072) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0045) 
Central bank assets -0.0024*** -0.0022* -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0025*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
MP(Deposit Facility) -0.0190*** -0.0140 -0.0166** -0.0211*** -0.0232*** 
  (0.0051) (0.0120) (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0075) 
Chinn-Ito index -0.0676 -0.0695 -0.0685 -0.0668 -0.0659 
  (0.0501) (0.1175) (0.0766) (0.0497) (0.0730) 
            
Observations 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220 23,220 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect 
competition). NIRP-effect is the interaction dummy Treatedij * Postjt; where Treatedij is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, while Postjt is a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 after the period that country j at time t decided to implement NIRP and 0 before that period. 
Funding Structure is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to total 
assets. Liquidity is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the ratio equity to total assets. Size is the logarithm 
of the bank total asset. GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Inflation is the Consumer Price Index. 
Central bank assets is the ratio central bank assets to GDP. MP is the Deposit Facility rate. Chinn-Ito is an index 
that measures the financial openness. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** 





Table 7. Robustness checks 
  
Panel A.  
Dummy 2014   
Panel B.  
Fictitious NIRP 
  (1)   (2) 
Variables Lerner index   Lerner index 
        
NIRP-effect 0.0084**   0.0004 
  (0.0033)   (0.0033) 
        
Observations 23,220   27,160 
R-squared 0.1034   0.0970 
Number of Banks 3,933   4,011 
Banks Fixed Effects YES   YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES   YES 
Cluster(id) YES   YES 
        
  
Panel C.  
Shorter window period   
Panel D.  
Competition 
  (3)   (4) 
Variables Lerner index   Negative H-statistic 
        
NIRP-effect 0.0164***   0.1527*** 
  (0.0036)   (0.0054) 
        
Observations 14,685   26,016 
R-squared 0.0738   0.2382 
Number of Banks 3,845   4,223 
Banks Fixed Effects YES   YES 
Time Fixed Effects YES   YES 
Cluster(id) YES   YES 
Note: Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges between 1 
(monopoly) and 0 (perfect competition). The H-statistic is a measure of competition, 
which ranges between ∞ (monopoly) and 1 (perfect competition); We use the opposite 
sign of the H-statistic aimed at improving the readability of the result. NIRP-effect is the 
interaction dummy Treatedij * Postjt; where Treatedij is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if bank i in country j has been affected by NIRP and 0 otherwise, while Postjt is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the period that country j at time t decided to 
implement NIRP and 0 before that period. Panel A displays difference-in-differences 
regression results of Lerner index in which post dummy is set in 2014. Panel B displays 
difference-in-differences regression results of Lerner index with “fictitious” NIRP dummy 
in 2012. Panel C displays difference-in-differences regression results of Lerner index 
within a shorter window period, that is from 2013 to 2016. Panel D displays difference-
in-differences regression results of the negative H-statistic. Standard errors adjusted for 
both within correlation clustered at the bank level and heteroskedasticity are in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 





Table 8: PSM estimates - Average treatment effect on the treated 
Variable:  Lerner index 
Sample Treated Control Difference S.E. T-stat 
Nearest neighbour 0.022328 0.007097 0.01523** 0.006236 2.44 
On support obs. 1461 986       
            
5-Nearest neighbour 0.022328 0.005295 0.017032*** 0.005348 3.18 
On support obs. 1461 986       
            
Kernel 0.022328 0.006346 0.015982*** 0.005096 3.14 
On support obs. 1461 986       
            
Note: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated obtained from the propensity score 
matching estimates calculated as the difference in Lerner index between the treated and the matched 
control groups according to three different matching algorithms.  Lerner index is a measure of banks’ 
market power, which ranges between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect competition). Significance levels: 







Figure A1. Market power distribution at the bank level. 
Figure A1 shows the market power distribution. For the Control group, even though there is a 
small shift, it appears similar for both pre-NIRP and NIRP period. Differently, for the 
Treatment group, we can observe a marked shift toward the right side, which means that market 




Table A1. Cross-correlation matrix of control variables. 
  Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 (1) Funding Structure 1 
 (2) Asset structure 0.22 1 
 (3) Liquidity -0.055 -0.338 1 
 (4) Leverage -0.186 -0.018 0.134 1 
 (5) Size -0.172 0.033 -0.013 -0.221 1 
 (6) GDP 0.096 0.004 -0.066 0.021 0.102 1 
 (7) Inflation 0.022 0.007 0.047 -0.02 0.017 -0.18 1 
 (8) Central bank assets 0.025 0.051 0.055 0.045 0.261 0.231 0.007 1 
 (9) MP(Deposit Facility) 0.003 0.045 0.041 0.008 0.165 0.027 0.418 0.191 1 
 (10) Chinn-Ito index -0.009 -0.015 -0.013 -0.003 0.046 -0.069 0.047 0.152 -0.35 1 
Note: Funding Structure is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to 
total assets. Liquidity is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the ratio equity to total assets. Size is the 
logarithm of the bank total asset. GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Inflation is the Consumer Price 
Index. Central bank assets is the ratio central bank assets to GDP. MP is the Deposit Facility rate. Chinn-Ito is an index 
that measures the financial openness. Table A.1 shows that our control variables are not highly correlated. 
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Table A2. This table displays variables, units, description and source of the variables used in the sample. 
Variables Units Description Source 
 Bank market power (Bank level)   
 Lerner index index 
Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, 
which captures the extent to which banks can 
increase the marginal returns beyond the marginal 
costs. It ranges between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect 
competition). 
Author calculation, data 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
Bank lending channel (Bank level)   
 Loans growth percentage 
Loans growth rate is widely used to assess the bank 
lending channel. It is the annual growth rate of the 
gross loans.   
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 Loans growth -
normalized percentage 
The normalized loans growth rate is the annual 
growth rate of loans normalized by the average 
annual growth rate during the four years prior to the 
NIRP introduction. 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
Bank stability (Bank level)   
 Z-score ratio 
Z-score is a measure of banks' soundness. It is the 
sum of ROA plus the ratio of equity-to-total assets, 
all divided by the standard deviation of ROA at 
country level. A high Z-score represents a greater 
level of bank stability. We use the logarithmic 
version of Z-Score. 
Author calculation, data 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 RORROA ratio 
RORROA is the risk-adjusted profitability, that is 
ROA divided by its volatility. A higher value of the 
ROR represents more bank stability. 
Author calculation, data 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
Bank balance sheet (Bank level)   
 Funding Structure ratio It gauges the bank dependence on deposit funding. It 
is the ratio total customer deposits-to-total assets. 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 Asset structure ratio 
Asset structure is widely considered an indicator of 
banking specialization. It is the ratio gross loans to 
total assets. 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 Liquidity ratio 
Liquidity considers the liquidity of the bank's asset 
side. It is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 Leverage ratio 
Leverage measures the bank's level capitalization. It 
is the ratio equity to total assets. BankFocus & SNL Financial  
 Size logarithm  
Size takes into account potential advantages due to 
cost benefits and better managerial skills. It is the 
logarithm of the bank total asset. 
BankFocus & SNL Financial  
Macroeconomics (Country level)   
 GDP percentage GDP is used as a proxy of market expansion. It is the 
real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. 
WDI & SDW 
 Inflation percentage 
Inflation is the Consumer Price Index. It is used to 
assess the presernce of an inflationary environment. WDI & SDW 
 Central bank assets ratio 
Central bank assets is a proxy of unconventional 
monetary policies. It is the central bank assets to 
GDP. 
WDI & SDW 
 MP(Deposit Facility) percentage 
MP is one of the main monetary policy rate, namely 
the official Deposit Facility rate. WDI & SDW 
 Chinn-Ito index index 
Chinn-Ito is an index that measures the financial 
openness. It evaluates the presence of barriers to 
entry in the domestic bank system. It ranges between 
1 (the highest openness) and 0 (completely 
restricted). 
 Chinn-Ito 
Tab A3. Descriptive statistics of control and treatment group prior to and after the introduction of NIRP 
  Treatment (NIRP affected) 
Variables Pre-NIRP (2011-2014)   NIRP period (2015-2018) 
 N.Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 Median p75  N.Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 Median p75 
Panel A : Bank market power 
 Lerner index 10149 0.20 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.26   10322 0.24 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.31 
Panel B : Bank lending chanel and bank stability 
 Loans growth 9354 3.14 13.47 -0.35 2.98 6.54   11854 4.55 15.62 0.93 4.31 8.18 
 Loans growth - normalized 9354 0.00 9.75 -2.17 0.00 2.10   11467 1.20 17.51 -2.79 0.91 5.01 
 Z-score 10939 1.25 0.60 1.01 1.25 1.52   12115 1.38 0.64 1.15 1.36 1.61 
 ROR 10950 0.15 0.38 0.06 0.12 0.21   12138 0.15 0.39 0.04 0.09 0.17 
Panel C : Bank balance sheet and macroeconomic variables 
 Funding Structure 11107 64.40 22.61 55.34 72.25 80.00   11575 67.15 22.21 61.97 74.75 81.56 
 Asset structure 10631 58.82 20.30 48.84 61.04 72.04   11877 59.72 20.60 49.88 62.72 73.48 
 Liquidity 9420 24.92 20.83 9.24 19.34 34.33   12131 23.26 20.82 7.69 16.81 32.30 
 Profitability 10950 0.40 1.01 0.15 0.30 0.53   12138 0.51 1.32 0.14 0.29 0.57 
 Leverage 11566 10.93 10.89 6.81 8.61 11.24   12168 12.34 12.20 7.82 9.58 12.13 
 Size 11592 6.60 2.04 5.19 6.41 7.68   12213 6.70 2.02 5.31 6.54 7.82 
 GDP 12272 0.94 1.89 0.42 0.58 2.23   12272 2.06 1.29 1.53 2.02 2.47 
 Inflation 12272 1.77 0.89 1.11 2.00 2.11   12272 1.00 0.72 0.49 0.90 1.70 
 Central bank assets 12159 1.46 2.15 0.16 0.23 1.61   9204 7.46 5.05 2.87 6.49 9.84 
 MP(Deposit Facility) 12272 0.14 0.22 -0.04 0.07 0.32   12272 -0.35 0.08 -0.40 -0.39 -0.29 
 Chinn-Ito index 12028 1.00 0.04 1.00 1.00 1.00   12028 1.00 0.03 1.00 1.00 1.00 
                            
  Control  (no-NIRP affected) 
Variables  Pre-NIRP (2011-2014)   NIRP period (2015-2018) 
 N.Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 Median p75  N.Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 Median p75 
Panel D : Bank market power 
 Lerner index 4525 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.31   4793 0.26 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.33 
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Panel E : Bank lending chanel and bank stability 
 Loans growth 4902 8.29 17.53 -0.01 7.19 17.53   5590 8.54 16.96 0.20 9.79 17.06 
 Loans growth - normalized 4902 0.00 13.09 -6.75 -1.20 7.11   5510 -0.13 18.52 -9.21 0.97 8.61 
 Z-score 5075 1.49 0.77 1.40 1.69 1.89   5805 1.55 0.76 1.44 1.72 1.92 
 ROR 5078 0.36 0.53 0.19 0.33 0.47   5804 0.31 0.41 0.17 0.27 0.38 
Panel F : Bank balance sheet and macroeconomic variables 
 Funding Structure 5183 68.35 39.04 55.87 77.72 84.30   5439 68.90 38.80 59.28 77.40 84.14 
 Asset structure 5349 63.41 19.66 54.45 67.15 76.25   5627 66.55 20.25 59.29 71.47 79.58 
 Liquidity 5414 27.01 18.40 14.81 23.25 34.75   5805 24.20 18.63 12.63 19.15 30.17 
 Profitability 5078 0.95 1.40 0.49 0.86 1.23   5804 1.05 1.39 0.56 0.93 1.29 
 Leverage 5497 12.19 10.46 8.38 10.23 12.53   5818 12.90 11.73 8.63 10.55 12.83 
 Size 5506 7.82 1.89 6.90 7.55 8.65   5819 8.17 1.91 7.35 8.01 9.05 
 GDP 5860 2.01 0.75 1.55 2.08 2.45   5860 2.46 0.90 1.89 2.36 2.93 
 Inflation 5860 2.14 0.90 1.47 2.07 3.16   5860 1.43 0.99 0.37 1.43 2.29 
 Central bank assets 5776 12.60 8.43 3.43 15.89 18.87   4332 15.65 10.06 4.63 21.75 22.62 
 MP(Deposit Facility) 5860 0.40 0.61 0.25 0.25 0.25   5860 0.75 0.66 0.26 0.51 1.10 
 Chinn-Ito index 5860 0.97 0.13 1.00 1.00 1.00   5860 0.98 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: Lerner index is a measure of banks’ market power, which ranges between 1 (monopoly) and 0 (perfect competition). Loans growth is the annual growth rate of 
the gross loans. The normalized loans growth rate is the annual growth rate of loans normalized by the average annual growth rate during the four years prior to the 
NIRP (2011-2014). Z-Score is the number of standard deviations that the bank's profitability (ROA) have to fall below the average for the bank to become insolvent. 
Z-score is a measure of banks' soundness. It is the sum of ROA plus the ratio of equity-to-total assets, all divided by the standard deviation of ROA at country level. 
A high Z-score represents a greater level of bank stability. RORROA is the risk-adjusted profitability, that is ROA divided by its volatility. Funding Structure is the ratio 
total customer deposits-to-total assets. Asset structure is the ratio gross loans to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio liquid asset to total assets. Leverage is the ratio 
equity to total assets. Size is the logarithm of the bank total asset. GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Inflation is the Consumer Price Index. Central 
bank assets is the ratio central bank assets to GDP. MP is the Deposit Facility rate. Chinn-Ito is an index that measures the financial openness. 
 
 
